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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders1 has long occupied 
courts and commentators interested in corporate governance.2 Creditors holding fixed 
claims to the corporation’s assets generally prefer corporate decision-making that 
minimizes the risk of firm failure.  Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for 
risk, because as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing 
the risk of loss with creditors.3
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 1Some of the best work in this area occurred in the period during and following the spate 
of highly leverage acquisitions of the 1980s.  See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt 
Relationships:  Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 Duke L.J. 92; Morey W. 
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. Law 413 (1986); Morey W. 
McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. Corp. L. 205 (1988); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1165 (1990).  Commentators also 
provided an empirical look at the impact of leveraged transactions of the 1980s.  See, Hurst & 
McGuinness, The Corporation, The Bondholder and Fiduciary Duties, 10 J. Law and Commerce 
187, 190 (1991) (reporting that between 1984 and 1989, more than 230 companies were involved 
in transactions that caused a downgrading of their debt instruments), and Marcel Kahan and 
Michael Klauser, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management 
Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 931, 993, n. 2d (1993) (reporting that between 1984 and 1988, 
“mergers, acquisitions or leveraged buyouts” caused the bonds of 183 companies to lose value).  
 See, also, Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., A Positive Analysis of the Common Law of 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 84 Ky. L. J. 455, 460-69 (1995-96) (hereinafter, “Campbell,  A
Positive Analysis”)(demonstrating the conflicts among shareholders, creditors and other 
corporate constituencies and the impact of managerial actions on the various corporate 
constituencies).  
 2See, Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1189 (2002) (describing the academic debate between Professors Berle and Dodd 
during the 1930s).  
 3Consider the following simple example.  Assume a corporation has a value of 100, 
which is represented by 50 in debt and 50 in equity.  The corporation has an opportunity to re-
2Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a 
fiduciary duty on the corporation’s managers – its officers and directors – to maximize 
the value of the shareholder’s interests in the firm.4 In this traditional view, officers and 
directors serve as agents of the shareholders and thus are charged with a fiduciary duty 
to maximize the value of the principals’ ownership interests.  Under this model of 
corporate governance, managers are not agents for the company’s creditors and thus 
owe no fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of creditors.5
For the most part, this traditional model of corporate governance has dominated 
corporate law.6 Over recent years, however, a number of courts have suggested or 
 
invest its assets in a way that has a 50% chance of achieving a value of 200 and a 50% chance of 
achieving a value of 0.  Creditors, as a result of the reinvestment will have an expected value of 
25, which consists of a 50% chance of 0 (= 0) and a 50% chance of 50 (= 25 [because of their 
fixed obligation, if the company achieves a value of 200, creditors still receive only 50]). 
Shareholders, however, have an expected reinvestment value of 75, which is a 50% chance of 0 
and a 50% chance of 150 (if the company achieves a value of 200, shareholders are entitled to 
200 minus the 50 claims of creditors).  
4See, e.g., Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 Geo. L. J. 439, 468 (2001) (managers have “duties to serve the interests of shareholders 
alone . . . .”); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative 
Corporate Law, 102 Yale L. J. 2021, 2031 (1993) (U.S. corporation law seeks “to maximize 
shareholder welfare.”).  
 5Although one is able to find occasional cases according creditors fiduciary or fiduciary- 
like protections, see, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1971, rev. on other 
grounds 480 F. 2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973), such cases are aberrational and inconsistent with the long 
standing, see, e.g., H. Ballantine, CORPORATIONS 184 (Rev. Ed. 1946) (“[c]reditors have no 
direct right of action against directors or officers for mismanagement . . . by the better view.”) 
and widely held rule that mangers owe creditors no fiduciary duties.  See, e.g., Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(no fiduciary 
duties owed to bondholders);  Skinner v. Hulsey, 138 So. 769,773 (Fla. 1931) ("Directors are not 
liable to the creditors on the theory of being fiduciaries."); Confick v. Houston Civic Opera 
Ass'n. 99 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tex. 1936) ("Directors are not personally liable to creditors for 
mismanagement, or for waste of assets except on proof of the commission of such fraud.");  
Whitfield v. Kern, 192 A. 48, 55 (N.J. 1937) ( management is not the agent for creditors).  
 6While not arguing that directors owe any affirmative duty to act in the best interests of 
non-shareholder constituencies, a recent line of scholarship argues that directors are not obliged 
to act in the best interests of shareholders.  This line of scholarship interprets modern corporate 
law as giving “directors free rein to pursue strategies that reduce shareholder wealth while 
benefitting other constituencies.” Stout, supra note 2, at 1202.  At another point in her piece, 
Professor Stout states that “corporate law . . . generally allows directors to redirect wealth from 
shareholders to other stakeholders.” Id., at 12023. As a positive matter, we reject this 
3held that these normal fiduciary duties of corporate managers may change when firms 
move into and through periods of deepening financial distress.  
 
Courts have staked out at least four separate periods as a company moves 
across a spectrum from financial solvency to bankruptcy.  The first period along the 
spectrum is the normal or solvent period for the corporation.7 Next is a period when the 
corporation is not yet insolvent but is close to insolvency.  Sometimes this period is 
called the “vicinity of insolvency” or the “zone of insolvency”.8 Next, as conditions 
continue to deteriorate, is a period in which the corporation is insolvent but has not yet 
filed for bankruptcy.9 Finally, the fourth period commences when the corporation files a 
bankruptcy petition and, we assume,  begins reorganization under Chapter 11.10 
While generally across this time spectrum courts define fiduciary duties as an 
obligation to maximize some “value,” the question of whose value is to be maximized in 
any given period is uncertain.  Three possible beneficiaries of managers’ value 
maximization obligation have emerged from the cases.  The beneficiaries may be: (1) 
shareholders; (2) creditors; or (3) the “corporation”, which should be interpreted as 
some combination of corporate stakeholders.  The cases hold or suggest that obligation 
of corporate managers in normal or solvent periods is to act in the best interests of 
shareholders11 but that the duty changes to an obligation to act in the best interests of 
the corporation once the firm enters the vicinity of insolvency.12 As the firm’s financial 
distress deepens and it passes out of the vicinity of insolvency and into actual 
insolvency, cases suggest or hold that the obligation of managers becomes a duty to 
maximize the interests of creditors.13 Finally, when the company enters bankruptcy and 
is operating under Chapter 11, the cases hold or suggest that the obligation is to 
maximize the total interests of creditors and shareholders as a whole.14 
This line of cases is rife with uncertainties. Defining the perimeters of the periods 
is often difficult. An obligation to act in the best interests of the “corporation” raises the 
 
interpretation and side with the traditional view that managers owe duties to the owners of 
corporations.  See infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.   
 7 See infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.  
 8 See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.  
 9 See infra notes 39-78 and accompanying text.  
 10 See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.  
 11 See infra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.  
 12 See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.  
 13 See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.   
 14 See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.  
4question of which of the corporate stakeholders or constituencies (e.g., employees, the 
community) are included in the “corporation”.  Is the obligation of corporate managers to 
act in the best interests of the preferred constituency (e.g., creditors) unbending, or is it 
permissible for managers to pursue a path that benefits a non-favored constituency 
(e.g., shareholders) at the expense of the favored constituency (e.g., creditors)?  If 
managers are permitted to pursue such a path, is there a limit on the extent of the 
permissible sacrifice managers may visit on the favored constituency?  
 
These shifting duties and the accompanying uncertainties cause problems for 
managers attempting to live up to their legal obligations. Even more important to us, 
however, is the pernicious impact that such confusion has on the pricing of capital and 
the allocation risks among investors.  When shareholders and creditors contribute their 
capital to a corporation, they price their investment and shape the terms of their contract 
in part by reference to fiduciary duties and the extent to which they are the beneficiaries 
of managers’ fiduciary obligations.15 Confusion and complexity respecting the matter of 
whose value in what period managers are obliged to maximize make it nearly 
impossible for investors – shareholders and creditors – to price the capital they 
contribute to the corporation and to allocate the risk of loss in corporate transactions to 
the most efficient bearer of that risk.16 
The purpose of this article is two fold.  First we offer a positive analysis of the 
fiduciary duties of managers, as corporations move along the time spectrum from 
solvency to Chapter 11 reorganization.  While, certainly, we are unable to clarify entirely 
the mess that courts have created, we believe that we are able to offer guidance 
regarding the present state of the law and how the law is likely to evolve on these 
important matters. 
 In the second part of the article, we offer our prescription for corporate managers’ 
fiduciary duties, as corporations move along the time spectrum from solvency to 
 
15A classic example is a provision in a loan agreement limiting the amount of dividends 
that can be distributed to shareholders. Without such a covenant, managers may have an 
incentive to pay large dividends to shareholders, making it less likely that the company can repay 
creditors according to the terms of their loan contract.   
 16The court’s opinion in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716
F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),  is interesting in this regard, since it affirms a view of fiduciary 
duties during normal or solvent periods that enable investors – shareholders and creditors – to 
price their capital they contribute and allocate risk among various investors.  In that case, 
bondholders argued that an implied term in their contract and fiduciary duties prevented RJR 
from assuming additional debt that depreciated the market value of the plaintiffs’ bonds.   In 
rejecting these claims, the court pointed out that the plaintiffs were some of the most 
sophisticated lenders in the country and had relinquished covenants that would have protected 
them from the adverse effects of additional leverage.  In short, the court concluded that these 
very sophisticated lenders had assumed and priced the risk of additional leverage by RJR.  
 
5bankruptcy.   Our view is that the fiduciary obligation of corporate managers should be 
uniform across the pre-bankruptcy period, changing only at the point the company 
enters into Chapter 11.  Our prescription is informed by simple economic concepts.  Our 
view is that clear and efficient default rules are of the utmost importance, since such 
rules will protect the expectations of the parties, respect their pricing, and thus facilitate 
an efficient allocation of the risk of loss in financial transactions.   
 
II.  POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
 
A.  In Normal or Solvent Periods 
In normal times – before a company enters bankruptcy or otherwise gets itself in 
a situation of financial distress – the fiduciary duties of corporate managers are often 
articulated by reference to best interests of “the corporation”.17 Notwithstanding such 
language, it is generally conceded that corporate managers are under a duty to act in 
the best interests of the company’s shareholders,18 a duty that is often stated in terms of 
an obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.19 
17For example, in their fine treatise, JAMES D. COX AND THOMAS LEE HAZEN 
CORPORATIONS (2d 2003), the authors state that “[w]hen directors or officers are guilty of 
mismanagement or negligence in conducting corporate affairs, the right of action is primarily in 
the corporation . . . .”  Id., at 217.  The authors go on to indicate that the managers’ duties are 
defined by the interests of shareholders:  “It is broadly recognized that the directors . . . owe their 
fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders; creditors rights are accordingly 
limited to the fair construction of a creditor’s contract with the corporation.”  Id.  
18The fiduciary duties owed to shareholders are typically broken down into two 
components, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.  See, e.g., COX AND HAZEN, supra note 17, 
at 184-207.  Under their duty of care obligation, corporate managers are obliged to act with a 
degree of care in regard to the maximization of shareholder wealth.  The degree of care directors 
are required to observe may differ, depending on whether the directors are involved in 
monitoring or making discrete decisions.  In monitoring, directors are most likely judged against 
a reasonableness or negligence standard.  See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A. 2d 814 
(S. Ct. N.J. 1984). In cases involving discrete decisions – a decision to facilitate the sale of the 
company, for example – directors operating under the business judgment standard may be held 
liable only if their decision is so unreasonable as to amount to gross negligence.  See, e.g.,
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“. . . under the business judgment rule 
director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”).  Whether the matter involves 
monitoring or a discrete decision, managers’ duty of care is measured against the obligation to 
act in the best interests of shareholders.  
 19See supra note 4.  See also, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in 
the Convergence Debate, 16 Transnat’l Lawyer 45,48 (2002)  (“Despite occasional academic 
6A corollary of this fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of shareholders is that 
corporate managers owe no fiduciary duty to the corporation’s creditors20 or any other 
non-shareholder constituency, such as employees.21 Duties to creditors (and other non-
 
arguments to the contrary, the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . indisputably is the law 
in the United States.”); ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986) (“. . . from the traditional 
legal viewpoint, a corporation’s directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to maximize 
shareholder wealth, subject to numerous duties to meet specific obligations to other groups 
affected by the corporation”).  A recent line of scholarship, developed in large part by Professors 
Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout,  interprets the duties of managers somewhat differently 
from the traditional view.  See, Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory 
of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999) This view rejects any ubiquitous obligation on the 
part of directors to act in the best interests of shareholders, and instead argues that “corporate law 
. . . generally allows directors to redirect wealth from shareholders to other stakeholders.”  Stout, 
supra note 2, at 1203.  According to Professor Stout, “Delaware gives directors free rein to 
pursue strategies that reduce shareholder wealth while benefitting other constituencies.”. Id., at 
1202 .  The authority relied upon to support this position includes the right of corporations to 
make charitable contributions, court opinions in takeover cases that allow directors to consider 
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, and state constituency statutes.  See, Blair & 
Stout, supra note 19, at 285; Stout, supra note 2, at 1201-1207.  
 20In addition to the cases cited in note 5, supra, the following cases are examples of 
decisions that support the lack of any managerial fiduciary duty to creditors:  Pittsburgh 
Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R. 680 F. 2d 933, 941 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1056 
(1982); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A. 2d 215 (Del Ch. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 347 A. 2d 133 
(Del. 1975).   See also, Lawrence Mitchell, supra note 1 at 1169, n.11 ("scholars supporting 
expanded bondholder rights do not have a great deal of law supporting them.").   
 21While as a positive matter, no one argues that managers owe any fiduciary duty to act in 
the best interests of employees, some scholars have argued that employees are especially 
vulnerable to expropriative conduct by corporate managers operating in the best interests of 
shareholders.  One argument is that employees make human capital investments in their firms 
and underprice their services in their early years with their firm in return for an implied promise 
from the firm to repay the employees in their late years.  Firms may have an economic interest in 
breaching this implied promise.  See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Policing Employment 
Contracts with the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm, 43 Toronto L.J. 353, 363-69 (1993);  Katherine 
Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders under State Nonshareholder Constituency 
Statutes, 21 Stet. L. Rev. 45, 48-53 (1991); and Marleen O'Connor, Restructuring the 
Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers,
69 U.N. Carol. L. Rev. 1189, 1205-07 (1991).  Predictably, other scholars argue that workers are 
fully capable of protecting their interests through contract and pricing.  See, e.g., Richard 
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51, Chi. L. Rev. 947, 954-55 (1984) (“people who 
are competent enough to marry, vote and pray are not unable to protect themselves in their day-
to-day business transactions”).  Other scholars also point out that expropriation of employees 
human capital investment may not be in the corporation’s best interest.  Clive Bull, the Existence 
7shareholder constituencies) are purely contractual in nature,22 except for discrete legal 
duties imposed on the corporation (and its managers), such as duties to refrain from 
paying excessive dividends to shareholders23 or engaging in fraudulent transfers.24 
To illustrate these basic points, consider an example roughly based on the RJR-
Nabisco case.25 Target is acquired in a highly leveraged acquisition.  It is an all cash 
deal at a price that amounts to a large premium over Target’s market price.  
Shareholders as a whole are better off as a result of the acquisition. The additional 
leverage, however, causes a significant loss in the market value of Target’s credit 
instruments. 
 
Target’s managers who facilitate this acquisition appear to be acting consistent 
with their obligation to maximize the wealth of Target’s shareholders.  It does not matter 
that part of Target shareholders’ gain came at the expense of the company’s creditors.  
Managers owe no broad fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of creditors.26 
of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts, 102 Q.J. of Econ. 147, 149-54 (1987) (creates morale 
problems for remaining workers); Jonathan R. Macey,  Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital 
Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 Duke L.J. 173,
192 (“employers’ need to maintain its reputation in the community and to attract new workers in 
the future will tend to discourage exploitation”). 
 22See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 
1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to find any implied term limiting the company’s assuming 
additional debt and refusing to extend any extra-contractual protections to creditors); Katz v. Oak 
Indus. Inc., 508 A. 2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (rejecting any duty to act in the best interests of 
creditors and stating that “if courts are to provide protection against such enhanced risk, they will 
require either legislative direction to do so or the negotiation of indenture provisions designed to 
afford such protection.”) 
 23The Model Business Corporation imposes both a balance sheet and an insolvency test 
on a corporate board’s right to pay dividends.  Model Business Corporation Act § 6.40(c) (2005).   
This provision is designed to protect non-shareholder constituencies against payment of 
excessive dividends to shareholders. 
 24Unif. Fradulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 643 (1984): 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548 (2005). 
 25Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 26While one may imagine that most highly leveraged acquisitions are powered, at least to 
some degree, by efficiencies, see Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 1, at 460-69, it is 
conceivable that some acquisitions may be powered only be expropriation and indeed may even 
generate negative efficiencies or synergies.  To use very simple numbers, assume that as a result 
of an acquisition creditors lose $20, shareholders gain $10 and no other corporate constituency is 
affected.  Even in that case, where the acquisition generates negative synergies, creditors would 
have no basis for a claim that the transaction violated any fiduciary duty owed to them.  
8Target’s creditors’ protections come only from the covenants in their indenture and from 
the extra contractual protections found in discrete legal rules of the kind mentioned 
above.27 
The foregoing discussion and example show that corporate managers’ fiduciary 
duty to shareholders is defined in terms of the duty to maximize the total wealth of 
shareholders considered as a whole.  There is, however, a second component to the 
fiduciary duty of corporate managers, and that is a duty to refrain from facilitating wealth 
transfers detrimental to any portion of the shareholders.28 Even if a transaction 
 
27The court in Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A. 2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) stated:  
 
It is the obligation for directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run 
interests of the corporation stockholders; that they may sometimes do so “at the expense” 
of others . . . does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.  It seems likely that 
corporate restructuring designed to maximize shareholder values may in some instances 
have the effect of requiring bondholders to bear greater risk of loss and thus in effect 
transfer economic value from bondholders to stockholders. . . . But if courts are to 
provide protection against such enhanced risk, they will require either legislative 
direction to do so or the negotiation of indenture provisions designed to afford such 
protection. 
 28Two examples of transactions that may involve wealth transfers detrimental to some 
part of the shareholders are, first, affiliated acquisitions, which are discussed below in the text, 
and, second, single company recapitalizations, by which we mean corporate transactions that 
affect the rights of shareholder – most usually preferred shareholders – but that otherwise do not 
change the nature of the corporation or its assets.  Examples of cases involving single company 
recapitalizations include Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 S. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943) 
(changing preferred's liquidation preference); Bowman v. Armour & Co., Superior Court, Cook 
County 1959 (unreported), rev. 17 Ill.2d 43, 160 N.E.2d 752 (1959) (changing redemptive 
rights); Bove v. The Community Hotel Corporation of Newport, Rhode Island, 105 R.I. 36, 249 
A.2d 89 (Sup Ct. R. I. 1969) (changing preferreds' entire bundle of rights).  The following are 
examples of cases in which preferred shareholders’ dividend arrearages were eliminated:  Barrett 
v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D.Del. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); 
Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. 1949); State v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853 
(Iowa 1948), cert, denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 341 
(Mich. 1949). 
 Although many of the single company recapitalization cases are older and thus do not 
benefit from more modern jurisprudence and scholarship regarding fiduciary duties, the cases 
generally hold that corporate managers or controlling shareholders must avoid transactions that 
treat the preferred shareholders in a manner that is unfair, grossly unfair or amounts to 
constructive fraud.   See, e.g., Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944)("so 
unfair as to amount to constructive fraud"; "gross unfairness"; although actual analysis appears to 
utilize a more rigorous fairness standard); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp. 53 F. Supp. 198 
(D.Del. 1943), aff'd 146 F. 2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944)( "constructive fraud", "bad faith" and "gross 
9increases shareholder wealth considered as a whole, managers breach their fiduciary 
duty by facilitating a transaction that transfers wealth from any group of shareholders 
(minority shareholders, for instance) to other shareholders (majority shareholders, for 
instance) or to non-shareholder constituencies.   
 
This rule can be illustrated by an example based roughly on Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc.29 Assume that Parent owns a majority interest in Subsidiary and that the managers 
of Subsidiary, who are nominees of Parent, facilitate a merger of the Subsidiary into 
Parent in which minority shareholders of Subsidiary are frozen out at an unfairly low 
cash price.  Assume further that the transaction is neutral regarding creditor wealth and 
generates efficiencies that enhance total shareholder wealth.  The problem, of course, 
is that the merger effects a wealth transfer from minority shareholders to majority 
shareholders, and that amounts to a breach of managers’ fiduciary duties to minority 
shareholders, even though total value of shareholder wealth is increased by the 
freezeout merger.  
 
Corporate managers’ fiduciary duties, therefore, are defined by reference both to 
wealth maximization and wealth transfers.  Simply stated, managers owe a duty to 
maximize the total wealth of shareholders as a whole and owe a duty not to facilitate 
wealth transfers detrimental to any group of shareholders.   
 
While the fiduciary duty of corporate managers is stated in terms of a duty to act 
in the best interests of shareholders, that duty has always been subject to certain carve-
outs that permit corporate managers to make limited wealth transfers from shareholders 
to other corporate constituencies.  Importantly, however, these carve-outs have never 
been defined as a duty to make such wealth transfers.  Rather, the carve-outs only 
amount to a right to make such transfers, and the right has always be subject to explicit 
or implicit limitations.   
 
One finds various examples of these carve-outs from the obligation to maximize 
shareholder wealth.  Familiar examples of carve-outs include the rights of corporate 
managers to cause their corporation to make charitable contributions,30 deploy 
 
unfairness"); Bowman v. Armour & Co., Superior Court, Cook County 1959 (unreported), rev.
17 Ill.2d 43, 160 N.E.2d 752 (1959)( "actual or constructive fraud" or "bad faith or reckless 
indifference"); Bove v. The Community Hotel Corporation of Newport, Rhode Island, 105 R.I. 
36, 249 A.2d 89 (Sup Ct. R. I. 1969) (court concluded that recapitalization met the most rigorous 
fairness standard). 
 29457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983).   The facts of that case as reported suggest that the 
acquisition of UOP by Signal generated efficiencies that increased shareholder wealth as a 
whole.   
 30MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 3.02 (2005) (general power to “do all things 
necessary or convenient . . . , including . . . power:   . . . (13) to make donations for the public 
welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes”).   See, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
10
defensive tactics in the face of an unsolicited takeover bid31 and make transfer 
payments to employees.32 
Constituency statutes are legislatively approved examples of such carve-outs.33 
Broader versions of constituency statutes apply to any actions of directors34 and 
typically expressly permit directors in taking action on behalf of the corporation to 
consider, in addition to the interests of the company’s shareholders, the “interests of . . . 
 
GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b) (1994) (authorizing gifts of a “reasonable amount of resources to public 
welfare . . . and philanthropic purposes”, even though “corporate profit and shareholder gain are 
not thereby enhanced”).  
 31For example, the Principles of Corporate Governance state that board facing an 
unsolicited tender offer may deploy defensive measures “if the action is a reasonable response to 
the offer.”  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 6.02(a) (1994).  The Principles go on to 
state that in determining whether the action is “reasonable” the board may “have regard for 
interests or groups (other than shareholders) . . . if to do so would not significantly disfavor the 
long-term interests of shareholders”.  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 6.02(b)2) 
(1994).  One finds similar language from significant acquisition cases.  See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 955(right in the face of an unsolicited takeover bid for 
board to consider “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, 
employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”). 
 32 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b) (Illus. 20) (1994)(an 
example involving a legally non-required payment to employees that are discharged by the 
company due to the company’s closing of a plant.  Even though such payments were not wealth 
maximizing for shareholders or the corporation, payments were a permissible “humanitarian” 
undertaking for the company). 
 33Presently, about 30 states have some form of a constituency statute. See Martin Lipton, 
Twenty-/Five Years after Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom: Old Battles, New Attacks 
and the Continuing War, 60 Bus. Law. 1369, 1371, n. 3 (2005)(“Approximately thirty states 
currently have constituency statutes in effect.”  Mr. Lipton provides citations to all such states).  
 The following are examples of some of the thoughtful articles that have been written on 
constituency statutes: James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency 
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97 (1991); James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent 
State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. Law. 
1207 (1988); Alexander C. Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors's 
Responsibilities Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes:  The Use of Explicit 
Contracts, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1451 (1990). 
 34See, e.g., Kentucky Revised Statute 721B.12-210 (4) (directors may consider non-
shareholder constituencies in discharging duties in connection with business combinations “or 
otherwise”).  
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employees, suppliers, creditors [and others] . . . .”35 The statutes amount to express 
permission for directors to facilitate actions that transfer wealth from shareholder to non-
shareholder constituencies.     
 
In all cases, however, there are significant limits on the amount of shareholder 
wealth that managers may transfer to non-shareholder constituencies.  The limits are 
usually described in general terms of “reasonableness”.   
 
The Principles of Corporate Governance, along with their Comments and 
Illustrations, illuminate this “reasonableness” limitation.  For example, the Principles 
affirm the right of management to make a “reasonable amount [emphasis added]” of 
charitable contributions.36 Regarding the use of defensive tactics in the face of an 
unwanted takeover bid, the Principles affirm the right of the board to take such action, 
so long as it “would not significantly disfavor the long-term interests of shareholders 
[emphasis added].”37 Perhaps the best illumination from the Principles of the 
“reasonableness” limitation is in two Illustrations in which a company proposes to 
continue operating an unprofitable plant in order to benefit non-shareholder 
constituencies, principally employees.38 The Illustrations conclude that the board could 
continue to operate the plant for a short period of time in order to ease the plight of 
employees who will loose their jobs but that the company is quite limited in how long it 
may operate the plant and how much of a loss is “reasonable” in such circumstances 
 
35See, e.g., Kentucky Revised Statutes 271B.12-200 (4) (2005).  Under that statute 
directors 
. . . may consider, in addition to the interests of the corporation’s shareholders, any of the 
following:  
 (a) The interests of the corporation’s employees, suppliers, creditors and 
customers; 
 (b) The economy of the state and the nation;  
 (c) Community and societal considerations; and 
 (d) The long-term as well as the short-term interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the 
continued independence of the corporation. 
 36PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b) (1994) (authorizing gifts of a 
“reasonable amount of resources to public welfare . . . and philanthropic purposes”, even though 
“corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced”).   
 37PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 6.02(a) (1994) (board may deploy defensive 
tactics in the face of an unsolicited bid “if the action is a reasonable response to the offer”, and in 
determining whether defensive tactics are “reasonable”, the board may “have regard for interests 
or groups (other than shareholders) . . . if to do so would not significantly disfavor the long-term 
interests of shareholders.”).   
 38PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01, Illus. 19 & 20 (1994). 
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The positive analysis we offer in this section leads to the conclusion that 
corporate managers’ fiduciary duties in normal or solvent periods are defined by 
reference to the best interest of the company’s shareholders.  Corporate managers owe 
a fiduciary duty to maximize total shareholder wealth and a duty not to facilitate wealth 
transfers detrimental to any of the shareholders.  These duties, however, are subject to 
certain carve-outs that enable managers to facilitate limited amounts of wealth transfers 
from shareholders to other corporate constituencies.  Corporate managers owe no 
similar fiduciary duties to creditors.  As a result, except for a very few discrete rules, 
such as limitations on the payment of dividends and prohibitions against fraudulent 
transfers, creditors for their own protection must rely on contractual protections that they 
construct and negotiate in each deal.  
 
B.  In Periods of Insolvency and Its Vicinity 
While the positive analysis we offer in the preceding section suggests that 
corporate managers’ fiduciary obligations in normal or solvent periods is to pursue the 
best interests of shareholders, courts in some cases – principally in cases from 
Delaware – have constructed different fiduciary duty regimes that they apply when the 
company is in or approaching insolvency.  These cases raise difficult interpretative 
matters that include not only the matter of defining the nature of fiduciary duties during 
these periods but also the matter of defining the perimeters of the periods themselves. 
 
1.  Insolvency.
Under Delaware law, once a company becomes insolvent, the duty of the 
corporation’s managers no longer amounts to an obligation to pursue the best interests 
of shareholders. Instead, as the Delaware court stated in Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications 
Co.,39 directors of an insolvent firm operating outside bankruptcy “are said to owe 
fiduciary duties to company’s creditors.”40 Delaware defines insolvency in this context as 
either “a deficiency of assets below liabilities with no reasonable prospect that the 
business can be successfully continued in the face thereof”, or “an inability to meet 
maturing obligations as they fall due in the ordinary course of business.”41 
39Geyer, v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A. 2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
 40Id., at 787, cited with approval in Production Resources Group, LLC. V. NCT Group, 
Inc., 863 A.2d 772,790-91 (Del. Ch. 2004).   
 41Siple v. S & K Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 182 WL 8789, at *8 (Del. Ch. 1982), cited 
with approval in Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772, 782 
(Del. Ch. 2004).  
 In In re Healthco International, Inc., 208 B.R. 288 (D. Mass 1997), the court appears to 
extend this fiduciary duty owed by managers to creditors into the period before the company 
becomes insolvent.   The court stated: “When a transaction renders a corporation insolvent or 
13
 
The reason offered for this dramatic shift –  away from the normal obligation of 
managers to maximize shareholder wealth –  is that during insolvency creditors, as 
opposed to shareholders, bear the brunt of damages for stupid or dishonest managerial 
conduct.42 If, to use a simple example, the value of a company’s assets is 80 and the 
claims of creditors are 100, a bad managerial decision that reduces the value of the firm 
to 60 injures, most apparently, the creditors, not the shareholders, who were underwater 
even before the bad act.    
 
Not only does this shift rest on problematic policy bases – a matter we discuss 
later43 – but also this shift in insolvent periods toward protecting the interests of creditors 
generates a number of difficult interpretative issues. 
 
We are, for example, able to offer at least three alternative interpretations 
regarding the nature of such any such fiduciary duties owed to creditors. The first 
possible interpretation is that the creditors and shareholders simply exchange places as 
the beneficiaries of corporate managers’ fiduciary duties.  Under this approach, at least 
as we have defined corporate managers’ duties during normal periods, managers 
during insolvency would be obliged to maximize the value of the creditors claims, 
subject to the right, but not any obligation, to make reasonable amounts of wealth 
transfers from creditors to other constituencies, including shareholders.  This represents 
a strong version of fiduciary duties to creditors.   
 
Under a semi-strong version of a fiduciary duty to creditors, managers during 
insolvency would be obliged to consider the best interests of creditors and shareholders 
as a whole.44 This version is analgous to managers’ present fiduciary during normal 
periods to minority and majority shareholders as a whole.  Managers operating in 
 
brings it to the brink of insolvency, the rights of creditors become paramount.”  Id., at 300 
(emphasis added).  This is apparently contrary to the position of the Delaware court in Credit 
Lyonnais, see the discussion at notes 53-56 and accompanying text, infra, which defines 
managers’ fiduciary duties in the “vicinity of insolvency” as being owed to the “community of 
interest”.  
 42See Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772, 790-93 
(Del. Ch. 2004) (describing creditors of an insolvent corporation as “the principal constituency 
injured” by mismanagement).   In Hechinger Investment Company of Delaware v. Fleet Retail 
Finance Group, et al., 274 B.R. 71, 89 (D. Del. 2002), the court stated that when a company 
“enters the zone of insolvency, the creditors – and not just the shareholders – are residual risk 
bearers”; the court stated that “directors can be said to be ‘playing with creditors money.’”   
 43See infra notes 125-132 and accompanying text.  
 44This would be similar to the rule that we believe applies during Chapter 11 
reorganizations, when managers are obliged to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate.  See 
infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.  
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normal or solvent periods presently have fiduciary duties both to the minority and 
majority shareholders, even though the interests of these two groups of shareholders 
may differ, and are obligated to maximize the total value shareholder interests as a 
whole and are prohibited from facilitating wealth transfers between groups of 
shareholders.45 
A third possible interpretation is a weak version of fiduciary duties to creditors.  
Under this interpretation, managers would continue to owe their primary duties to 
shareholders but would be accorded more leeway in making decisions that effect wealth 
transfers from shareholders to creditors.  To use an example, if one assumes that in a 
normal or solvent corporation a board, consistent with the members’ fiduciary duties, 
perhaps could make a decision that reallocated 5% of shareholder wealth to creditors, 
in an insolvent period the board could reallocate 30% of shareholder wealth to 
creditors.46 
The confusion regarding the nature of corporate managers’ duties when 
operating in a period of insolvency is significant and pernicious.47 Perhaps most 
 
45Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983),  holds that managers operating in 
solvent periods breach their fiduciary duty by facilitating a transaction that transfers wealth from 
minority shareholders to majority shareholders.  See generally, Campbell, A Positive Analysis,
supra note 1, at 455-469 (describing, with graphic representations, fiduciary duties to 
shareholders and the fiduciary duty rule that prohibits corporate managers from facilitating 
wealth transfer transactions detrimental to any shareholder group). 
 46This appears to be the interpretation of Chancellor Strine in Production Resources 
Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004) with regard to fiduciary 
duties of corporate managers when the corporation is in the “vicinity of insolvency.”  See the 
discussion at notes 66-69 and accompanying text, infra.
47Unfortunately, court decisions following the Geyer decision have only confused matters 
more.  
 One of the most dramatic examples of a court’s confusion can be seen in Hechinger 
Investment Company of Delaware v. Fleet Retail Finance Group, 274 B.R. 71 (D. Del. 2002).   
In considering whether directors of Hechinger acted consistent with their fiduciary duties when 
they approved a LBO, the court assumed in a motion to dismiss that Hechinger was insolvent at 
the time of the approval of the LBO.  The court at one point states that “insolvency triggers 
fiduciary duties for directors for the benefit of creditors . . . . [emphasis added]”;  in the 
immediately following paragraph, however, the court states that “in insolvency, the directors’ . . . 
fiduciary duties are to multiple constituencies . . . [and]  that in insolvency the duty runs not 
directly to the creditors but to the ‘community of interest.’ [emphasis added]”   Id., at 90.  This 
reflects a fundamental confusion regarding the beneficiaries of managers’ fiduciary duties when 
the company is insolvent.  When operating in insolvency, do corporate managers owe a duty to 
act in the best interests of creditors, or do they owe a duty to act in the best interests of some 
combination of the corporation’s constituencies (e.g., some combination of creditors, preferred 
15
obviously, uncertainty over the proper interpretation of the duty to creditors makes it 
difficult for managers operating in periods of insolvency to make legally proper 
decisions.  Assume, for example, that  corporate managers operating in insolvency are 
offered two alternate investment opportunities for the company.  Confusion about which 
interpretation of the duty to creditors is applicable may make it impossible for managers 
to select the investment that is consistent with their legal duties to creditors. 48 
While, certainly, we are concerned with the plight of corporate managers 
attempting to deal with the meaning of their duty to creditors in times of insolvency, also 
important to us are the problems the confusion generates regarding investment risk 
allocation and pricing of capital by investors.  When investors contribute their capital to 
a corporate enterprise, they demand a return that depends on the terms of their 
investment contract.  Implicit in shareholders’ investment contract is an obligation that 
corporate managers will act to maximize the value of their interests, and shareholders 
price their investment in light of that managerial obligation.  A corollary is that corporate 
creditors construct the terms of their investment contract and price their investment 
based on the assumption that no fiduciary duties are owed to them.  Confusion on the 
 
shareholders, majority common shareholders, minority common shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, the community, etc.)? 
 48Consider the following example in that regard.  Assume B Co. is insolvent with assets 
worth 80 and creditors’ claims amounting to 100.  Managers are offered two alternate re-
investment opportunities.  The first is an opportunity to re-invest the company’s assets in a 
project with a 50% chance of amounting to 100 and a 50% chance of amounting to 80.   The 
project has a total expected value of 90 ((.5 x 80 ) + (.5 x 100)  =  90), and creditors’ reap the 
entire gain.  Shareholders still have an expected value of 0.  The second opportunity involves a 
project with a 50% chance of amounting to 50 and a 50% chance of amounting to 150.  The 
expected value of that project is 100 ((.5 x 50) + (.5 x 150) = 100), which as a whole is superior 
to the first project.  Creditors, however, are worse off, since the expected value of their claim is 
75 (50% chance of 50 and a 50% chance of 100).  Shareholders are better off under this 
investment, since their claim now has an expected value of 25 (a 50% chance of 0 and a 50% 
chance of 50).  For similar examples, see Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate 
Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1489-91 
(1993) and  Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried,  Managers Fiduciary Duty upon the Firm’s 
Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1813, 1821-25 (2002). 
 Under the strong version of fiduciary duties to creditors – obligating managers to act in 
the best interests of creditors -- managers would likely be obliged to select the first investment, 
since it maximizes the creditors’ interests.  Under the semi-strong version – obligating managers 
to maximize the value of the interests of creditors and shareholders as a whole –  managers 
would likely be obliged to select the second investment but may still face the question of whether 
a fiduciary duty to creditors can be reconciled with a transaction that actually decreases the 
wealth of creditors.  Under the weak version of the duty to creditors – obligating managers to act 
in the best interests of shareholders but permitting them to make larger wealth transfers to 
creditors – managers may be able to choose either investment and still be consistent with their 
fiduciary duties. 
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part of shareholders and creditors regarding these duties of corporate managers may 
lead to unintended outcomes, which means that investors may have mispriced their 
capital.49 Efficient and accurate ex ante allocation of risk of loss and pricing depends on 
intelligible rules regarding the beneficiaries of corporate managers’ fiduciary duties.  
Notwithstanding the substantial confusion in this area, our positive analysis 
supports the conclusion that the duty of managers during periods of insolvency run to 
creditors and that courts are most likely to interpret this duty in terms of creditors’ 
stepping into the shoes of shareholders.  Our positive conclusions are supported by 
Chancellor Strine’s analysis in Production Resources.50 After describing directors in 
insolvency as owing “fiduciary duties to the company’s creditors,”51 Strine suggests 
strongly that the only change in directors’ duties in insolvency is a change in  “the 
constituency on whose behalf the directors are” to pursue wealth maximization.52 
49Assume, for example, that an investor taking an equity position in a corporation 
requires a 10% return on her investment, due in part because the investor believes that mangers 
in all instances are obliged to pursue a path that maximizes the value of shareholders’ interests.  
If, instead, the rule is that at some point managers’ duties shift and to an obligation to pursue a 
path that maximizes the best interests of creditors, the equity investor may demand a return of 
11% (rather than 10%) on her investment. Similarly, a creditor who demands a 6% interest rate, 
due in part because the investor believes that managers are in all instances obliged to pursue a 
path that maximizes the value of shareholders’ interests, may be willing to accept a 5% interest 
rate, if managers are required at some point to act in creditors’ best interests.   
 Confusion about the existence of a rule requiring this shift or the meaning of the 
obligation to act in the best interests of creditors may make it impossible for shareholders and 
creditors to price their investments.  
 50Production Resources Group, LLC. V. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772 (Del. Ch. 
2004).   
 51Id., at 791. 
 52Id. Although this interpretation has a symmetrical appeal and may seem easiest to 
apply, courts applying a step-into-the-shoes duty on behalf of creditors will still have tough 
issues to consider.  Perhaps the most difficult issue will be the extent to which, under a step-into-
the-shoes regime, courts will permit managers to take action that benefit the un-privileged 
constituency – now shareholders – at the expense of the privileged class – now creditors.  In 
normal or solvent periods, we concluded that such wealth transfers benefitting creditors at the 
expense of shareholder may be possible, provided such wealth transfers were reasonable in 
amount.  See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.  Some commentators, however, argue 
that directors have nearly unlimited power in solvent periods to transfer wealth from 
shareholders to creditors and other corporate constituencies.  See supra note 19 and 
accompanying text.  Transporting such an interpretation into insolvency – in a reversed form, of 
course – would seem to do substantial damage to the perceived need to protect creditors from a 
diminution in the value available to pay their claims. 
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2.  Vicinity of Insolvency 
Delaware courts have created a third zone that might be described as a pre-
bankruptcy period in which the company is near, yet short, of actual insolvency.53 The 
seminal case here is Credit Lyonnais,54 where Chancellor Allan stated that when “a 
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely 
the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”55 
Chancellor Allan continued, stating that the board’s obligation in such circumstances is 
“to the community of interest that sustained the corporation . . . to maximize the 
corporation’s long-term wealth creating capacity.”56 
Reserving for later a consideration of the appropriateness of repeatedly shifting 
fiduciary standards as a company passes from solvency to the vicinity of insolvency to 
actual insolvency,57 the opinion in Credit Lyonnais creates a number of difficult 
interpretative problems.58 
53One of the problems with this third zone is the difficulty in defining its perimeter.  See 
infra notes 59 and accompanying text.  Our description of the perimeter – “near but yet short of 
actual insolvency” – is not intended as a basis for any definition or re-definition of the vicinity of 
insolvency. 
 54Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Communications Co., 1991 WL 277613 
(Del. Ch.).  
 55Id., at 34.  
 56Id. 
57See infra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.   
 58The opinion in In re Healthco International, Inc., 208 B.R. 288 (D. Mass 1997) shows 
the confusion in this area.  Healthco appears to make creditors the beneficiaries of managers’s 
fiduciary duties in the vicinity of insolvency, although this certainly is not entirely clear from the 
opinion.  In Healthco. the court stated: “When a transaction renders a corporation insolvent or 
brings it to the brink of insolvency, the rights of creditors become paramount.”  Id., at 300 
(emphasis added).  This appears contrary to the position of the Delaware court in Credit 
Lyonnais, which defines managers’ fiduciary duties in the “vicinity of insolvency” as being owed 
to the “community of interest”.  See supra notes 55-56, and accompanying text,.  It is also 
unclear, whether the “brink of insolvency” in Healthco is the same as the “vicinity of 
insolvency” in Credit Lyonnais. In Healthco, the court suggested that the “brink” of insolvency 
is a situation in which the corporation has “unreasonably small capital”, or when the corporation 
faces an “reasonable risk of insolvency, not necessarily a likelihood of insolvency.”   In re 
Healthco International, Inc., 208 B.R. at 302.  The “vicinity of insolvency” was undefined by the 
court in Credit Lyonnais. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.   
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 Commentators have pointed out, for example, the obvious interpretative difficulty 
in charting the perimeter of the “vicinity of insolvency”.59 It is an inherently vague 
standard, which the Court in Credit Lyonnais made no attempt to define.60 With 
managers now facing three different fiduciary obligations – depending on whether the 
company is solvent, insolvent or in the vicinity of insolvency – managers are left with 
little idea about when they might be in the vicinity of insolvency and thus legally bound 
to pursue a path that is consistent with their obligation to the “community of interest”, 
instead of a path that is consistent with either the best interests of shareholders (solvent 
period) or the best interests of creditors (insolvent period).    
 
Equally perplexing and troublesome are ambiguities concerning the scope of the 
“corporate enterprise” or the “community of interest”,61 which the Credit Lyonnais case 
makes the beneficiary of managers’ fiduciary duties while the corporation is operating in 
the vicinity of insolvency.62 The discussion of the court in Credit Lyonnais focuses 
entirely on two constituencies – shareholders and creditors.63 There are, however, 
other corporate constituencies that might be included in the “community of interest”, 
including, for example, employees and the community.64 What is uncertain is whether 
 
59See, e.g., Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of 
Distressed Corporations, 7 GMLR 45, 72 (1998) (“If uncertainty necessarily exists as to whether 
a corporation’s financial position meets a well-articulated test – one of the multiple definitions of 
insolvency – this uncertainty is compounded as to whether a corporation’s financial position 
meets an imprecise test.”). Professor Barondes also is troubled by the ambiguity in the term 
“wealth creating capacity.”  Id., at 73.  
 60Id., at 72  (“The Court did not even announce an imprecise test as to when a corporation 
is in the vicinity of insolvency.”).   
 In Healthco, the court use the term “brink” of insolvency and attempted to amplify the 
meaning of this term as a situation in which the corporation has “unreasonably small capital”, or 
when the corporation faces an “reasonable risk of insolvency, not necessarily a likelihood of 
insolvency.”   In re Healthco International, Inc., 208 B.R. 288, 302 (D. Mass. 1997).  See the 
discussion in note 41, supra.
61Professor Barondes is also troubled by the ambiguity in the term “wealth creating 
capacity.”   See, e.g., Id., at 73.  
 62¶Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Communications Co., 1991 WL 
277613, at 34  (Del. Ch.).  
 63Id., at 34 and note 55. 
 64See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 955 (target board may in 
the face of an unsolicited takeover bid consider “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than 
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community 
19
the obligation of managers operating in the vicinity of insolvency to maximize the best 
interests of the “community of interest” requires or permits managers to consider the 
best interests of constituencies such as employees and the community, or, alternatively, 
whether managers are only to consider the interests of shareholders and creditors.65 
Chancellor Strine’s sweeping dictum in Production Resources66 exacerbates the 
ambiguities of Credit Lyonnais. To Strine, Credit Lyonnais dictates no fundamental shift 
in corporate managers’ fiduciary obligations when their company enters the vicinity (or, 
as he calls it, the “zone”) of insolvency.67 The fundamental obligation to act in the best 
interests of shareholders continues.  Strine views Credit Lyonnais as merely creating a 
“shield” for corporate managers, a shield that apparently allows managers operating in 
the vicinity of insolvency more discretion to make decisions that benefit creditors at the 
expense of shareholders.68 In short, the duty of corporate managers in the vicinity of 
insolvency, as Strine sees it, continues to be an obligation to act in the best interests of 
shareholders, subject, however, to an expanded right (but no obligation) to transfer 
wealth from shareholders to creditors.   
 
Strine’s fundamental point – that moving from solvency to the vicinity or zone of 
insolvency should not change managers’ basic fiduciary obligation to act in the best 
interests of shareholders – is in our view sound.69 The interpretative difficult, however, 
 
generally)”).  See also the discussion of constituency statutes at notes 33-35 and accompanying 
text, supra.
65Consider the following example, which is based to some extent on an illustration from 
the Principles of Corporate Governance. See, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01, 
illus. 19& 20 (1992).  While operating in the vicinity of insolvency, managers are faced with a 
decision whether to close an unprofitable plant, which will result in the lay off 1,000 employees 
and economic devastation of  the small community in which the plant is located.  Closing the 
plant will increase the value of the interests of shareholders and creditors as a whole but will be 
contrary to the best interests of employees who will lose their jobs and the community which will 
lose its major employer.  It may be that, considered as a whole, the interests of shareholders, 
creditors, employees and the community will actually decrease in total, but, obviously that is 
nearly impossible to determine.  
 66Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).  
 67See, e.g., id. at 788, n. 52 (“seems . . . less plausible that directors’s duties somehow 
change profoundly as the firm approaches insolvency”). 
 68Strine states that “Credit Lyonnais provided a shield to directors from stockholders who 
claimed that the directors had a duty to undertake extreme risk . . . .”  Id. at 788.  The imagined 
facts are that the company is offered an investment opportunity that will reduce the value of the 
interests of the creditors and shareholders considered as whole but will benefit shareholders.  
 69See infra notes 125-134 and accompanying text. 
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is that Strine’s rule in Production Resources cannot be reconciled with Credit Lyonnais.
Simply stated, the rule from Production Resources is that managers operating in the 
vicinity of insolvency owe the duty to maximize the interests of shareholders, subject to 
an expanded right to take actions that benefit non-shareholder constituencies at the 
expense of shareholders.  The rule from Credit Lyonnais is that managers in the vicinity 
of insolvency owe the obligation to maximize the interests for corporate constituencies 
as a whole.  Those amount to different rules that posit different duties for managers and 
thus may obligate managers to pursue different paths in order to comply with their 
fiduciary duties. 
 
Our positive analysis suggests to us that courts are likely to take Credit Lyonnais 
at face value and thus likely to apply the rule as there articulated – that when operating 
in the vicinity of insolvency, managers owe fiduciary duties to “the community of 
interest.”  We fully appreciate, however, the confusion on this matter and that 
Chancellor Strine’s opinion in Credit Lyonnais only adds to the confusion regarding the 
proper interpretation of Credit Lyonnais. We also reiterate the point from the 
immediately preceding section of this paper – that the confusion has pernicious effects 
on corporate managers attempting to comply with their fiduciary duties and on the 
efficient allocation and pricing of investment risks.70 
C.  Bankruptcy Court’s Interpretations of Managers’ Duties Before Bankruptcy:
Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein71 
Under the positive analysis that we have so far constructed, the nature of 
managers’ fiduciary duties depends on the financial situation of their company at the 
time managers take the action in question.  Thus, if at the time managers’ actions occur 
the corporation is solvent, managers fiduciary duties are to shareholders; if, however, at 
the time of the managers’ action the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency, 
managers duties are to the community of interest, and if the corporation is insolvent at 
the time, managers owe their duties to creditors. 
 
The court in Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein,72 however, appears to apply 
a different analysis.  Wieboldt suggests – perhaps rather strongly – that any claim of a 
pre-bankruptcy breach of fiduciary duty against corporate managers, if raised in a 
bankruptcy proceeding, will be measured against the best interests of creditors, no 
matter whether at the time of the alleged breach the company was solvent, in the 
vicinity of insolvency or insolvent.   
 
70See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 7194 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
 72Id. 
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 In Wieboldt, corporate managers approved a series of transactions in an LBO 
that resulted in lucrative payments to shareholders and that added substantial secured 
debt owed by Wieboldt.  In less than a year, the company filed a bankruptcy petition, 
and the debtor in possession representing the interests of the unsecured creditors, sued 
the managers, claiming, inter alia,73 that managers breached their fiduciary duties by 
facilitating the LBO and thereby failing to preserve the corporate assets for the benefit of 
creditors.   
 
The court in Wieboldt found that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to support 
a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the directors.74 While the analysis and the 
language of the court are confusing, the decision rests squarely on a duty that 
managers owed to creditors,75 and the opinion offers no suggestion that the obligation 
to creditors depends on the corporation’s insolvency.  So interpreted, the case would 
recognize a fiduciary duty to creditors anytime a claim for a pre-bankruptcy breach of 
that duty is raised in a bankruptcy proceeding, irrespective of the whether at the time of 
managers’ actions the company was solvent, in the vicinity of insolvency or insolvent.   
 
73The plaintiff also claimed the the LBO involved actual or constructive fraudulent 
transfers and were thus voidable under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C §548 
(2006).  Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 493 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (plaintiff 
sought “to avoid the transactions constituting the LBO on the grounds that they are fraudulent 
under federal and state fraudulent conveyance laws”). Such claims have become common in 
bankruptcies resulting from failed LBOs and are based on the idea that because the proceeds of 
the acquisition debt is paid to the shareholders, the target corporation received less than a 
reasonably equivalent value for the debt.  A successful application of the theory results in some 
combination of a recovery of the amounts paid to shareholders and a cancellation of the debt and 
security interests incurred and granted in the deal. 
 
74 94 B.R. at 510. 
 75For example, the court at one point states that “A corporate board of directors has a 
fundamental duty to protect the corporate enterprises from ‘harm reasonably perceived, 
irrespective of its source’”, citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 492 A. 2d 946, 954(Del. 
1985).  Id., at 509.  At another point the court stated that the board is required to “determine 
whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”  Id., at 509-510.  
At another point the language appears to recognize that the core beneficiaries of managers’ 
fiduciary duties are creditors: “Wieboldt, as debtor-in-possession of its bankrupt estate, clearly 
may assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of its group of unsecured creditors.”  
Id., at 508-509. 
 Notwithstanding this confusing language, it is clear that creditors are the beneficiaries of 
the duties articulated in Wieboldt. The core of the claim in Wieboldt is that shareholders 
benefitted by transferring wealth to themselves from creditors.  
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 This interpretation of Wieboldt creates havoc for managers.  Consider, once 
again, the circumstances of corporate managers in a solvent period who are offered an 
opportunity for a LBO that benefits shareholders at the expense of creditors.  Managers 
facilitating such a transaction would be found to be acting consistent with their fiduciary 
duties, if a claim were brought against them outside a bankruptcy proceeding, but 
inconsistent with their fiduciary duties, if the claim were brought as part of a bankruptcy 
proceedings.   
 
Despite its confusing analysis and sweeping rhetoric, we consider Wieboldt an 
early application of the general principle described above, which is that creditors 
become the beneficiaries of managers’ fiduciary obligations when the company is 
insolvent.  Factually this interpretation of Wieboldt is supportable, since the court in its 
analysis of the fraudulent transfer claims noted that Weiboldt was allegedly insolvent at 
the time of the transaction, and that the LBO resulted in further insolvency.76 Moreover, 
fiduciary duty claims such as these are not a creation of bankruptcy law, but are simply 
state law claims that are owned by the debtor and, upon filing, become property of the 
bankruptcy estate.77 Thus rather than announce a principle of bankruptcy law, Weiboldt 
is best understood as a case about state fiduciary duty law that is applicable in periods 
of insolvency.  Subsequent bankruptcy cases may support this more limited reading of 
Weiboldt.78 
76 Id. at 502. 
 7711 U.S.C. § 541 (2006); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 448 (1979) (“Property 
interests are created and defined by state law.  Unless some federal interest requires a different 
result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an 
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”).  See also, In re Healthco, 208 B.R. at 
300 (“Any Healthco claim is an interest in property which passed to the bankruptcy estate.  The 
Trustee can bring any suit Healthco could have brought, including suits against directors and 
controlling shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty.”),. 
 78In Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del. v. Fleet Retail Finance Group, 274 B.R. 71 (D. Del. 
2002),  fiduciary claims against corporate managers were bought by the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Hechinger and arose, the Committee claimed, out of a LBO that:  
“[S]hifted all of the risk of the Debtors’ operations to their unsecured creditors” 
by cashing out [the shareholders] equity interests in Hechinger while incurring on 
behalf of Hechinger hundreds of millions of unserviceable secured debt, at a time 
when the company was insolvent. 
Id. at 75 (quoting amended complaint).   
 In its discussion of the Committee’s fiduciary duty claim, the court clearly tied its 
conclusion, that the defendant’s owed a duty to the creditors to the Committee’s allegation that 
Hechinger was insolvent at the time of the LBO.  Id. at 90.  In fact, the court noted that if the fact 
of insolvency were taken as true, “defendants, as directors and controlling shareholders, cannot, 
and do not, contend that they do not owe certain fiduciary duties to the unsecured creditors.”  Id. 
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 In all events, however, Wieboldt demonstrates once again the confusion wrought 
by courts in this area.  The opinion obscures the true nature of the problem, which is a 
classic conflict between the interests of shareholders and creditors.  The court, 
however, confusingly characterizes the duty of managers as running to the 
“corporation”, while in fact holding that the duty runs to creditors, all this done with no 
explanation as to why the traditional duty to shareholders is not applicable.   
 
D.  Duties of Corporate Managers in Bankruptcy Cases 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is designed to offer a collective response to 
the unique problems financially distressed firms face.   As a firm’s financial status 
worsens, individual creditors natural incentive is to withdraw their capital – leading to a 
race to the courthouse that would, if unchecked, lead to an inefficient liquidation of the 
corporate assets.79 Chapter 11 stays individual debt collection actions,80 permits the 
 
In re Healthco Int’l, Inc., 208 B.R. 288 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997), also involved a LBO 
that resulted in a bankruptcy just over two years after the closing.  Upon Healthco’s bankruptcy 
filing, the trustee brought fraudulent transfer and breach of fiduciary duty claims against the 
directors.  
 The defendant-directors challenged the Trustee’s fiduciary duty claim, stating that their 
obligations were limited to protecting the shareholders’ interests.   The court stated, however, 
that where a transaction leaves a corporation insolvent, or brings it to the brink of insolvency, 
“the rights of the creditors become paramount.”  Id. at 300.  In addition, the court stated that 
“directors of an insolvent Delaware corporation breach their fiduciary duties to creditors, even in 
the absence of formal insolvency proceedings, when they authorize fraudulent conveyances that 
cause the corporation to be insolvent in fact.  Id., at 301, citing Geyer. 
Requiring directors to look out for the interests of creditors as well as stockholders 
involves no irreconcilable conflict, as contended by defendants. It is merely an incident 
of the fiduciary obligations owed by directors to their corporation. A distribution to 
stockholders which renders the corporation insolvent, or leaves it with unreasonably 
small capital, threatens the very existence of the corporation. This is prejudicial to all its 
constituencies, including creditors, employees, and stockholders retaining an ownership 
interest. Surely it is not asking too much of directors that they honor their obligations of 
loyalty and care to avoid the corporation's destruction.   
Id. 
79 The seminal article on bankruptcy as a response to collective action problems is 
Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91
Yale L.J. 857 (1982);  See also, Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and 
Bankruptcy:  A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 827 (1987) . 
 80 The automatic stay, provided in 11 U.S.C. §  362, prohibits actions to collect debt, 
enforce judgments, and exercise control over property of the estate. This provision forces the 
parties to operate within the confines of the case. The automatic stay ensures that the pre-
bankruptcy owners will participate in the proceeding by stopping all creditor collection efforts 
and interference with property of the state. Because financial problems do not occur overnight, 
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continued operation of the business and imposes a structure for collective negotiations 
over the future of the firm.81 
The initiation of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, thus marks a substantial change 
in the way the corporation is governed and, accordingly, a change in the fiduciary duties 
of corporate managers.82 Creditor contracts are no longer effective to control inefficient 
investment in risky projects desired by shareholders.  In place of those contracts, 
Chapter 11 substitutes a governance regime that includes creditor representation, 
negotiation and default rules regarding the allocation of value in a reorganization plan, 
and judicial oversight over most important decisions.83 
Under this regime, the law requires managers to fulfill the fiduciary 
responsibilities of a trustee to act in the interests of both creditors and shareholders.84 
The point of convergence for these naturally opposed constituencies is the value of the 
assets, or, in bankruptcy parlance, the “estate.”85 Thus, bankruptcy courts often 
 
the preference provisions of the Code provide a reach back to bring debts paid on the eve of 
bankruptcy within the proceeding. These provisions make bankruptcy a truly collective 
proceeding in which everyone must participate.  
 81 These negotiations generally revolve around the formation of a plan of reorganization.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (contents of a plan). The plan provides the financial structure of the 
reorganized entity as well as other provisions that will govern the company as it emerges from 
the protection of the bankruptcy proceedings.  
 82 Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the general rule is that pre-bankruptcy 
managers will stay in control of the business through the fictitious entity known as the “debtor in 
possession.”  11 U.S.C. § 1101 defines "debtor in possession" as being the  "debtor" unless a 
trustee has been appointed. The "debtor" is the entity that is the subject of the bankruptcy case. 
11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988). For most purposes, the debtor in possession can be regarded simply 
as the pre-bankruptcy corporation with special rights and obligations under the Bankruptcy 
Code. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984); Raymond T. Nimmer & 
Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, 
Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 20- 37(1989). 
 83 See Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate 
Governance in Bankruptcy, 72 Am. Bankr. L. Rev. 103 (1998). 
 84 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355-56 
(1985) (“the fiduciary duty of the trustee runs to shareholders as well as to creditors”).  In re 
Schepps Food Store, 160 B.R. 792, 797 (“A trustee's constituency. . . is broadened under the 
Code to include not only the debtor and its shareholders, but also all of the debtor's creditors.”) 
 85 See In re Big Rivers Electric Corp., 233 B.R. 726, 734-35 (Bkrtcy, W.D. Ky. 1998) (“It 
is beyond dispute that a Chapter 11 DIP owes a fiduciary duty to all of the creditors and other 
interest holders of its bankruptcy estate to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate.”); 
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articulate the duty as one to maximize the value of the estate, rather than to benefit a 
particular group of claimants.86 
Like non-bankruptcy courts’ references to the “corporate enterprise” and 
“community of interests,”87 bankruptcy courts’ reference to the estate may promote 
confusion regarding the beneficiaries of managerial duties in bankruptcy.  Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, the term “estate” refers to all of the pre-bankruptcy corporation’s 
property and interests in property.88 Thus, at its simplest level, the duty to maximize the 
estate equates to a duty to maximize the value of all of the corporations assets for the 
benefit of shareholders and creditors as a whole, without regard to the distributional 
outcome.  Employees and other non-investor constituencies may benefit from decisions 
in the bankruptcy process but the Bankruptcy Code does not require, or perhaps even 
permit, the bankruptcy judge to consider the effect of managerial decisions on these 
constituencies.89 
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Matter of Central Ice Cream90 provides an 
illustration of managers’ duties in Chapter 11.  In that case, shareholders of the debtor 
appealed an order of the bankruptcy court approving a settlement of litigation between 
the debtor and a third party.  The creditors favored the settlement because it was 
sufficient to pay their claims in full.  The district court affirmed the order and sanctioned 
two of the shareholders for challenging the settlement.  In its order approving  the 
settlement the bankruptcy court made clear that it was guided by the best interests of 
the creditors, stating: 
 
To seek greater return for the shareholders at risk to the creditors 
would be most unfair. A creditor supplies to a business in return for 
getting paid an agreed price. A stockholder puts up risk capital as 
an investment. The creditor's interest is given major consideration 
because it is fair that creditors who expected and deserved no risk 
 
LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F.Supp. 2d 279, 293 (D. Del. 2000)(“Officers and directors 
should have broad latitude to balance competing interests in a bankruptcy case in order to make 
decisions that are in the best interests of the estate.”) 
 86 See In re Central Ice Cream, 836 F.2d 1068 , 1072 (7th Cir. 1988) (trustees duty is “to 
maximize the value of the estate, not of a particular group of claimants”). 
 87 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
 88 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
 89 See Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the 
Judicial Process, 74 N. CAR. L. REV. 75 (1995) ( hereinafter, Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive 
Policies). 
90 836 F.2d at 1068. 
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should not now risk losing all in an effort to recover more for 
investors.91 
In analyzing the trustee’s claim for sanctions, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
bankruptcy court’s analysis of the settlement and of the duty of the trustee to protect the 
creditors’ interests fell wide of the mark.  Rather than protect the creditors from all risk of 
loss, the court stated, the trustee was under a duty to maximize the value of the estate.  
What the court recognized is that, once they were assured that their claims were paid in 
full, creditors had no incentive to continue to pursue the litigation regardless of the 
expected value of that option.  While it was true that a continued  pursuit of the litigation 
would expose creditors to risk, the risk was parallel to the risk creditors face outside of 
bankruptcy.92 
The Central Ice Cream court thus recognized that neither creditor-focused duties 
nor shareholder-focused duties, will necessarily lead to decisions that maximize the 
value of the firm as a whole.  Shareholders, because they do not bear the full cost of an 
incorrect decision, would be more inclined to roll the dice in the hope of a jackpot 
recovery.  Creditors, on the other hand, naturally favor any disposition that would result 
in payment in full, regardless of whether that disposition maximizes the value of  the 
assets.  Because the normal contractual processes that mediate these inefficient 
incentives are restricted in Chapter 11, courts seek to reach the efficient result directly.93 
91836 F.2d at 1072, quoting In re Central Ice Cream, 59 B.R. 476,  487 (Bankr, N.D. Ill. 
1985). 
 92 Id. at 1072. 
 93 Although a close examination of the bankruptcy process leads to the conclusion that 
managers should focus on the maximization of asset value, courts occasionally employ rhetoric 
that suggests a more creditor-focused duty.   For example, where a firm is clearly insolvent, 
courts often state that the interests of shareholders must be subordinated to the interests of 
creditors.  CFTC v. Weintraub,  471 U.S. at 355.  This statement does not mean, however, that 
the courts are employing a creditor maximization principal.  Instead, the subordination of 
shareholder interests in insolvent estates is entirely consistent with the norm of firm value 
maximization.  Requiring managers to consider the interests of out of the money shareholders 
would lead an overinvestment in risky projects (such as the continuation of a business that would 
have more value in liquidation) that would be fundamentally inconsistent with value 
maximization.  Courts that formulate the duty as one owed to both shareholders and creditors are  
then left to explain why shareholder interests and desires in clearly insolvent corporations are 
disregarded.  See id. (“In cases in which it is clear that the estate is not large enough to cover any 
shareholder claims, the trustee’s exercise of the corporation’s attorney-client privilege will 
benefit only creditors, but there is nothing anomalous in this result; rather it is in keeping with 
the hierarchy of interests created by the bankruptcy laws.”) 
 A related area of confusion arises where managers take actions in bankruptcy cases that 
are designed to increase shareholder returns solely at the expense of creditor returns.  Tenn-Fla 
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 The duty to maximize the value of the estate is built into the structure and 
purpose of the bankruptcy process.  Chapter 11 is premised on the idea that a 
negotiated resolution of financial distress will lead to value maximizing decisions 
regarding the assets of the firm.  To further this idea, the Code provides a forum for 
collective negotiation which makes possible the capture of going concern value that 
might otherwise be lost in a liquidation.94 Throughout the process, the push and pull of 
shareholders and creditors is evident as the parties and the bankruptcy judge wrestle 
with such questions as whether and when to sell assets, to assume or reject executory 
contracts, to settle claims, and, perhaps most importantly, to appoint a trustee or 
convert the case to a liquidation under Chapter 7.  Most of the bankruptcy decisions on 
these types of issues depict a bankruptcy judge who is aware of the differing incentives 
of shareholders and creditors and who seeks a decisions that will maximize the value of 
the assets. 
 
III. PRESCRIPTION 
 
Our positive conclusions are that, outside of the bankruptcy context, Delaware 
law generally obligates corporate managers in normal periods to act in the best interests 
of shareholders, in the vicinity of insolvency to act in the best interests of the corporation 
as a whole, and in insolvency to act in the best interests of creditors. 
 
We find this regime to be ambiguous, confusing and inefficient and urge 
Delaware courts to reconsider the matter.  We also strongly urge other states to reject 
this regime.  The regime is in our minds an example of the all too frequent the mess that 
Delaware courts make of fiduciary duties. 
 
The rule that managers must act in the best interests of shareholders and that 
non-shareholders must rely on contract for their protections generally leads to efficient 
 
Partners v. First Union National Bank,  229 B.R. 720 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) provides an example. In 
that case, the debtor’s managers failed to disclose several pre-confirmation bids for the assets of 
the partnership, an apartment property.  The creditors complained that the debtors managers held 
off several bidders on the property during negotiations that resulted in a plan of reorganization.  
After a plan was confirmed that resulted in a 75% recovery to the secured bondholders, the 
debtor sold the property for almost $12.5 million, an amount that would have resulted in the 
bondholders being paid in full. Id. at 736.  By failing to disclose the interest of the buyers, the 
debtor succeeded in reducing the creditors claims and to recover the 25% reduction for the equity 
holders. 
 The debtor attempted to justify its actions by claiming that, as debtor in possession, it 
owed a duty to both creditors and equity holders and that its actions were an attempt to recognize 
both of those interests.  The court made short work of this argument, stating, “Even ignoring 
TFP’s failure to account for its fiduciary duty to the court, the court finds that TFP’s failure to 
maximize the value of the estate was a breach of its fiduciary duty.” Id. 
94See Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 89 (1992). 
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outcomes.  It seems likely that if shareholders (owners) and managers (agents) were 
able to bargain with one another the shareholders would be willing to purchase some 
level of fairness and due care from their managers.  Non-shareholder constituencies in 
most cases can be expected either to price the risk that managers’ actions may be 
deleterious to their best interests or mitigate or eliminate such risks through contract 
provisions.   
 
The filing of a bankruptcy petition, however, prompts a change in the legal 
landscape that makes a shift in fiduciary duties appropriate.  The automatic stay that the 
Bankruptcy Code imposes effectively precludes the normal contractual remedies that 
operate under non-bankruptcy law.  The right to declare a breach and withdraw capital 
from a corporation when managers violate contractual protections is anathema to the 
collective nature of the bankruptcy process.  In place of those remedies, the Chapter 11 
process substitutes a system of managerial duties to the “estate,” specific voting rights, 
creditor representation, judicial supervision, and judicial approval of specific managerial 
decisions to control the behavior of managers. 
 
Bankruptcy also has the benefit of providing a bright line standard for the shift in 
managers’ duties that the credit markets need to price risk efficiently.  Prior to 
bankruptcy, under Delaware law, shareholders, lenders and others cannot determine 
ex-ante when a shift in duty might arise.  As a consequence, these constituencies never 
know precisely when managers will be permitted, or required, to look out for their 
interests.  As a consequence, creditors may undervalue the protection Delaware law 
provides, while shareholders may over-estimate the cost that creditor protection 
imposes on them.  Shifting duties only on bankruptcy provides clarity that should 
increase efficiency in pricing.  
 
This section offers a closer look at the justifications underlying the shareholder 
wealth maximization principle and develops the argument against the approach the 
Delaware courts have taken to fiduciary duties as corporations approach and enter a 
state of insolvency.   
 
A.  The Normative Justifications for Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
 
As stated earlier, the shareholder wealth maximization norm underlying corporate 
governance has a long history in corporate law and is the dominant approach used by 
courts. In most cases we believe that, shareholder wealth maximization leads to 
efficient results.  We recognize, however, that some scholars have attacked shareholder 
wealth maximization normatively – arguing that it is not an attractive goal – and 
positively – arguing that it does not adequately describe today’s law.95 
95See authorities cited supra notes 1,6,19 and 21. 
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 This article does not make a strong claim that shareholder wealth maximization is 
the best or even the most efficient approach to corporate governance issues.96 Instead 
we take the model as a given and focus principally on the effect that a shift in fiduciary 
duties has on the financial markets and the parties ability to price risk.  Notwithstanding 
this focus, some understanding of the normative underpinnings of the shareholder 
wealth maximization principle is necessary to an understanding of the reasons for and 
against shifting those duties. 
 
1.  Criterion for efficiency analyses of corporate governance regimes. 
 
The basic criterion for analysis of the efficiency of any corporate law or regulation 
is whether the law or regulation in question tends to lead the parties to maximize the 
value of the corporate enterprise.  From this starting point, corporate law makes the 
general assumption that the parties with capital and other inputs to the corporation have 
the proper set of incentives to bargain for the governance regime that maximizes the 
overall value of the corporate enterprise.  Rather than directly regulate corporate 
actions, therefore, corporate law generally establishes a set mandatory and default 
rules that may be explained as mimicking the bargain fully informed and rational parties 
would choose for themselves.97 
2. Shareholder Wealth Maximization and the Efficiency Criteria. 
 
The shareholder wealth maximization criterion underlying corporate governance 
takes its normative basis from the idea that the equity ownership in the firm stands as a 
market-based proxy for societal wealth maximization, because shareholders hold the 
residual claim on the firm’s assets.  When a firm is solvent, and is likely to remain 
solvent, shareholders’ gains and losses are usually in lockstep with the value of the firm.  
Thus when the firm’s managers maximize shareholder gains, they are also maximizing 
 
96  The authors are not in complete agreement on the question.  Campbell has argued in 
favor of expanding the beneficiaries of corporate managers’ fiduciary duties to include non-
shareholder constituencies.  See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary 
Principles for the Post-Contractarian Era, 23 Fla. State. L. Rev. 561 (1996).  Frost believes that 
the judicial decision making process is not well suited to evaluate managers’ decision making on 
the basis of corporate wealth maximization or any other regime that requires a court to balance 
the benefits and losses a particular decision imposes on diverse constituencies.  Accordingly, 
Frost favors a regime that points managers in one clear direction with a robust regulatory and 
contract regime that provides specific protection to other constituencies. See, e.g., Frost, 
Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies, supra note 89.   
 97 See Gregory Scott Crespi, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The Inefficiency of 
the Shareholder Primacy Norm, 55 S.M.U. L. Rev. 141, 142 (2002) (Professor Crespi 
approaches the efficiency question by asking, “[W]hich assignment of duties . . . more closely 
replicates the jointly wealth-maximizing structure of rights and duties to which rational 
bargainers establishing a corporation would agree to in costless negotiations?”).  
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the value of the assets under their control.  Fiduciary duties therefore serve the purpose 
of focusing discretionary managerial decision making on maximizing asset value.98 On 
this view, fiduciary duties are “gap fillers” in the relationship between shareholders, as 
owners of the corporations assets, and managers – reducing the transaction costs and 
agency problems inherent in the separation of ownership from control.99 
The presence of corporate debt and the accompanying possibility of insolvency 
skews corporate incentives away from the close relationships between the wealth of the 
financial investors and the value of the firm, however.  Once a corporation issues debt, 
shareholders have an incentive to overinvest in risky projects, while creditors have an 
incentive to avoid risk.100 Because shareholders, as residual claimants, share the risk 
of loss with creditors but reap the gains from success, they have an appetite for risk that 
increases with leverage.  Concomitantly, creditors, who bear some of the risk of loss but 
do not share in gains, would prefer reduced risk.  Both shareholders’ and creditors’ 
incentives may differ from the investment approach that would maximize the value of 
the firm.101 
The conflict is further exacerbated when we take into account the fact that 
financial investors are not the only stakeholders interested in corporate decision-
making.  Employees, customers and the surrounding community all contribute to the 
societal benefits of the corporate form and are all affected by managerial decision 
making.  These stakeholder groups hold incentives that differ from financial investors, 
and some scholars have argued forcefully that managers should be permitted to take 
their interests into account when making decisions on behalf of the corporation.102 
98  See Laura Lin, supra note 48 at 1485 (“[R]equiring directors to maximize shareholder 
interest provides a fairly accurate benchmark for maximizing the long-term, wealth-producing 
capacity of the firm.”). 
 99 Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV.
23, 26-29 (1991); Crespi, supra note 97 at 141-42 (“Many situations arise where the proper 
choices to be made by corporate officials are not completely determined by [contracts between 
financial claimants and the corporation]. There is an obvious need for courts to impose some 
principle of accountability to guide those officials in their exercise of the often substantial 
discretion left to them by their incomplete instructions . . .”).  
 100  See Barondes, supra note 59 at 49 (1998) (The theory of the corporate enterprise has 
long recognized that conflicting incentives are created when a corporation issues debt.”). 
 101  Lin, supra note 48 at 1496 (“neither shareholders nor creditors have the incentive to 
maximize the value of the insolvent firm”);  
 102 See supra notes 19 and 21.
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 One way of resolving these conflicts is to require managers to maximize the 
value of corporate assets under their control for the benefit of all interested parties.  
Several corporate law commentators have argued that corporate value maximization 
should be the standard by which courts should judge managerial decision-making.103 
The normative appeal of this approach is evident upon review of the basic criterion for 
wealth maximization.  The goal is to maximize societal wealth and, to the extent no 
single investor group holds a set of incentives that is consistent with that goal, direct 
regulation of managerial activities to achieve the goal may be appropriate. 
 
In large part, however, corporate law and commentary has resisted this 
approach.  Instead, the mismatch of incentives among stakeholders is mediated through 
a nexus of contracts that requires non-shareholder constituencies to fix the parameters 
of managerial decision-making.  Creditors, employees and other interested stakeholders 
negotiate for specific protection through contract and are further protected through 
similarly specific laws and regulations.104 These protections,105 along with the 
protections provided by fraudulent transfer laws,106 set the boundaries for managerial 
discretion within which managers act for the benefit of shareholders.107 
103  See Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional 
Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214 (1999) (arguing that rational investors 
holding diversified portfolios would agree to a rule that requires managers to maximize the value 
of the corporation, rather than any particular class of claimants); Crespi, supra note 97 at 152-
153 (concluding that the locus of corporate officials’ fiduciary duty should be the corporation, 
rather than shareholders). 
 104 See infra notes 131-132 and accompanying text. 
 105 See Crespi, supra note 97 at 141 (noting the conventional view that “[w]hen corporate 
directors and officers . . . make decisions within the remaining zone of discretion, whose 
boundaries are defined by these contractual provisions, they are regarded as subject to a fiduciary 
duty to maximize shareholder wealth.”). 
 106  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 107 Proponents of shareholder wealth maximization advance a range of justifications for 
the approach.  Bainbridge, for example, focuses on the “two masters” problem, which posits that 
a fiduciary serving two masters cannot make principled trade-offs between the two, and the 
“managerial sin” problem, under which a fiduciary with two masters can play the masters off of 
one another to the fiduciaries benefit. Stephen N. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder 
Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1435-
38 (1993); see also Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.L. REV.
595 (1997). Macey focuses on the cost of contracting, noting that shareholders are the parties 
most in need of, and willing to pay for, the benefits of fiduciary duties.  See Macey, supra note 
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 Considered as a whole, these fiduciary rules that are applicable in normal or 
solvent periods usually provide incentives for efficient outcomes.  The obligation of 
corporate managers to maximize the total wealth of the company’s shareholders 
creates an incentive for managers to make efficient investments – in technology, for 
example – as a way to enhance the profit of the owners of the company. Similarly, a 
rule that discourages wealth transfers detrimental to shareholders is also efficient.  
Wealth transfer transactions do not necessarily improve allocative efficiency but do 
involve transaction costs.  For those reasons, such wealth transfer transactions are 
generally inefficient as an economic matter.108 
Although generally efficient, these fiduciary rules provide incentive for inefficient 
conduct in some cases.  Denying other corporate constituencies – perhaps most 
apparently, creditors – the benefit of fiduciary duty protections may provide managers 
an incentive to construct inefficient transactions.  
 
99 at 36-39 (arguing that shareholders are the group that most needs the gap-filling protection 
that fiduciary duties provides). 
 108 Returning to an example loosely based on Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A. 2d. 701 (Del. 
1983), assume that a merger of majority owned subsidiary into its parent creates no efficiencies 
but, instead, is driven only by the transfer wealth from minority shareholders to majority 
shareholders.  That transaction does no improve allocative efficiency but does involve 
transaction costs.  It is, therefore, an inefficient transaction as an economic matter. On economic 
grounds, such transactions should be discouraged.  Under another approach, some may also wish 
to discourage such transactions on the grounds of unfairness, since such wealth transfer 
transactions generate uncompensated losers (e.g., minority shareholders are not compensated for 
losses they suffer in the value of their investments).  
 Even when wealth transfers are imbedded in transactions that otherwise move assets into 
hands that are more efficient, allowing such transaction may nonetheless create incentives for 
inefficient outcomes.  Consider the following example.   Imagine that Target Co.’s common 
stock is selling for $10 and that Aggressor A and Aggressor B are bidding for Target’s stock.  
Aggressor A values Target’s net assets at $15 and the opportunity to expropriate value from 
other constituencies at $10.  Aggressor B values Target’s net assets at $18 but is unable or 
unwilling to expropriate any value from other constituencies, and thus values that opportunity at 
$0.  Aggressor A, who values Target’s assets less, will likely be the successful bidder for 
Target’s stock, since it can pay up to $25, while Aggressor B, the one who values the net assets 
most, can pay only $18.  The outcome is once again inefficient.   
 Accordingly, today’s corporate fiduciary rules, which condemn the managerial 
facilitation of wealth transfer transactions without regard to whether total shareholder value as a 
whole is increased, are sound.  
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 An extreme example of an incentive for an inefficient transaction can be built on 
the basic facts of the old Keebler case.109 K is the 100% shareholder of M Corp., which 
has a significant amount of debentures outstanding.  K sells all its M Corp. stock to A 
Corp., which then loots the assets of M Corp., thus rendering M Corp. unable to meet its 
obligation to its debentureholders.  The claim in Keebler was that K, the selling 
shareholder, breached a fiduciary duty to its debentureholders by failing to investigate 
the bona fides of the purchaser, A Corp.110 To deny creditors – here, debentureholders 
– fiduciary duty protection in such a case may provide an incentive for the sole 
shareholder to sell to an inefficient looter.  A looter may be able to pay the highest price 
for the company, even though the looter is not the most efficient utilizer of the 
company’s assets, because the looter can recognize the value of the owner’s interest in 
the assets and expropriate creditors’ interests by theft.111 
A less extreme and more typical example of situations in which today’s fiduciary 
duty rules provide an incentive for an inefficient transaction involves a highly leveraged 
acquisition of the type described earlier.112 The power of shareholders to expropriate 
value from other constituencies – most apparently, creditors – can provide a powerful 
incentive for transactions that do not improve allocative efficiency.113 
109Swinney v. Keebler Company, 329 F. Supp. 216 (D. S.C. 1971), reversed on other 
grounds 480 F. 2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973).  
 110This District Court in Keebler held that Keebler violated a fiduciary duty owed to 
debentureholders by selling to a corporate looter.  Id., at 224.  While one is able to find other 
examples of cases in which courts extend fiduciary or fiduciary-like protections to creditors, such 
cases should be considered aberrations of the widely held view that no fiduciary duty is owed by 
corporate managers to the corporation’s creditors.  See supra notes 5 and 20 and accompanying 
text.  
 111An example may be helpful.  Assume that M Corp. in the hands K of has assets with a 
total value of $100, represented by $50 in debentures and $50 in market value stock.  The most 
efficient legitimate bidder may value the assets at $110 and thus be willing to pay $60 for K’s 
stock.  An inefficient looter, however, may be able to bid $70 for K’s stock, since the looter 
intends to steal all of M Corp.’s assets and sell them for $80.  
 112 See the discussion in notes 25-27 and accompanying text, supra.
113Assume that the value of Target’s assets in the hands of its old managers amounts to 
$100, which represents $50 equity and $50 in debt.  A transaction in which the assets are moved 
into the hands of less efficient managers – assume the new managers can only manage the assets 
in a way the generates value of $90 – can nonetheless benefit the equity owners, if, for example,  
the value of their interests go to $60 and the value of creditors’ interests go to $30.  If managers’ 
interests are aligned with the owners’, managers have an incentive to facilitate this inefficient 
transaction.   
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 Beyond the possible allocative inefficiency that can result from such highly 
leveraged acquisitions and spin offs,114 such transactions may raise distributive, or 
fairness, issues in the minds of some.  Redistributing creditor wealth to shareholders – 
even if accompanied by improved allocative efficiency – may seem unfair and 
distasteful to many and thus not the type of transaction that society should sanction.   
 
Creditors, however, are not without protections from such expropriative 
transactions.  Fraudulent conveyance statutes, for example, protect creditors.115 
Creditors also can protect themselves by ex ante contract.  A poison put that is 
triggered by a significant increase in the company’s debt is an example of such a 
protective provision.  Alternatively, of course, creditors can extract ex ante 
compensation for the risk by demanding a higher interest rate to pay them for the 
possibility of future losses due to an increase in the company’s debt.  
 
High transaction costs, however, may create a seam within which it is impossible 
for some creditors to protect themselves by contract.   Small or involuntary corporate 
creditors are perhaps the best examples of corporate constituencies unable to protect 
themselves by ex ante contract from expropriative moves by shareholders and 
corporate managers.116 
Although structured as a spin off, the reorganization of Marriot in the 1990s provides and 
example a transaction that may have been driven solely by expropriation and thus was not 
efficient.  In the reorgainzation, Marriot split itself into two separate companies.  One of the new 
companies owned its profitable hotel management business.  The other retained Marriot’s real 
property and its debt.  When the reorganization was announced, the value of the stock of Marriot 
increased significantly, and the value of its bonds decreased significantly.  Bondholders in total, 
however, apparently lost more than shareholders in total gained.  For an excellent short 
description of the Marriot transaction see William W. Bratton, CORPORATE FINANCE CASES AND 
MATERIALS 238 (5th ed. 2003)(“According to Parrino, Spinoffs and Wealth Transfers: The 
Marriott Case, 43 J. Fin. Econ. 241 (1997), the bondholders losses incident to the Marriot spin 
off were not . . . equaled . . . by stockholder gains.”).   
 114 See the description of the transactions in note 26, supra.
115 See Unif. Fradulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 643 (1984): 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548 (2005). 
 116 See Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors; Power Imbalance and the 
Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA Law Rec. 1189 (2003).  The author argues that 
creditors that have “volition, cognition, and exit . . . should be limited to the contractual rights 
they have (probably laboriously) negotiated.”  Id., at 1193.  He identifies other creditors with 
“low levels of volition, cognition and exit . . . [that] should benefit from some sort of fiduciary 
duty from directors in the distressed corporation . . . .”  He identifies these creditors as “tort 
creditors”, “certain terminated employees,” “taxing authorities” and “certain trade creditors.”  
Id., at 1245.   
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Today’s fiduciary duties, which deny fiduciary protections to creditors, may be 
understood to represent a decision by society that, on balance, the risk of inefficient and 
expropriative transactions are best handled by contract and discrete societal rules, such 
as the rules that forbids fraudulent conveyances.  While some may not agree with that 
determination and consequently argue that the seam described in the immediately 
preceding paragraph is broad and thus capable of generating significant amounts of 
inefficient and expropriative conduct, the clear and long standing rule of society that is 
manifested in such decisions as Metropolitan Life117 and Katz118 is that the best way to 
deal with the risk is by contract and discrete rules.  In economic terms, society seems to 
believe that the benefits from any remedy of the problem are less the costs of the 
remedy.   
 
While a normative debate over the proper approach continues, positive corporate 
law seems squarely focused on shareholder wealth as the predominant goal of fiduciary 
duties.119 As described above, inefficient transactions and uncompensated losses are 
possible within this regime, but society seemingly has determined that the regime is 
acceptable.120 One might describe this as a determination that the cost of eliminating 
the possible inefficient and unfair transactions exceeds the benefits from eliminating the 
transactions.  In short, society seems satisfied that fiduciary duties are efficient for 
shareholders and managers and that non-shareholder constituencies are efficiently able 
to construct and price the protections that they desire or need by contractual provisions. 
 
B. Fiduciary Duties In and Near Insolvency. 
 
As discussed in Section II, courts have applied a confusing array of standards to 
judge the behavior of managers of insolvent or nearly insolvent firms.  The following 
discussion examines and challenges the normative underpinnings for the shift of duty 
upon financial distress and makes the case for maintaining the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm throughout the decline of the corporation until the point at which a 
Chapter 11 case is instituted.     
 
1. Normative Justifications for the Shift of Duty upon and in the Vicinity  
 of Insolvency. 
 
117 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. JRJ Nabisco, Inc. 716 F. Supp. 1504 
(D.D.N.Y. 1989).  
 118 Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A. 2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).  
 119 See supra notes 17-38 and accompanying text. 
 120 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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 The normative case for shifting the focus of managers’ fiduciary duties away from 
shareholders and toward the corporation or creditors upon or near insolvency rests on a 
claim that the deterioration of the company’s financial status enhances the incentives, 
and the power, of shareholders to expropriate value from creditors.121 In its simplest 
form, this claim is based on the notion that insolvency marks a shift in residual 
claimants.  The standard story posits that upon insolvency, shareholders lose their 
economic stake in the enterprise and therefore no longer place money at stake in the 
business decisions.  Creditors, on the other hand, now occupy the residual claimant 
position and therefore hold the correct set of incentives to maximize the value of the 
business.122 
At first blush, a fiduciary duty regime that adjusts as the corporation passes from 
financial health to financial distress makes some sense.  The vicinity of insolvency 
cases are grounded on the idea that insolvency is not a singular event that suddenly 
marks a change in the incentives of the investors.   Corporations are not solvent one 
moment and insolvent the next.  Instead, corporations slide toward and into insolvency 
over time.123 To the extent that shareholder wealth maximization is justifiable because 
 
121 See Barondes, supra note 59 at 49 (“The theory [of the corporate enterprise] predicts 
that when a corporation is insolvent or on the verge of insolvency, the incentive to pursue risky 
investment strategies may increase.”); Lin supra, note 48 at 1489 (“When the corporation is 
insolvent or at the brink of insolvency, the difference in risk preference between shareholders 
and creditors is magnified with respect to corporate investment policies.  During this period of 
financial stress, shareholders favor highly risky projects, even if thoese projects have only a 
slight chance of generating income large enough to cover the firm’s debt and still provide some 
return to shareholders.”). 
 122 Lipson, supra note 116 at 1192, characterizes the  standard account of fiduciary 
duties as follows, “As the corporation becomes financially distressed, creditors become its 
residual claimants, and are in a sense subrogated to the rights and privileges of shareholders, who 
no longer have an economic stake in the corporation.”  See also, Steven Schwarcz, Rethinking a 
Corporation’s Obligation to Creditors, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 647,667 (“Creditors of an insolvent 
corporation, however, not only have a senior right to repayment but they also now have the right, 
traditionally associated with ownership, to the "upside" in value of the corporate debtor's assets, 
at least until the corporation regains solvency.  This right is similar to a shareholder's right to the 
equity of a solvent corporation: in economic terms, the creditors have now become the primary 
residual claimants.”) But see Lin, supra note 48 at 1498 (noting that upon or near insolvency, 
“creditors want management to preserve the assets available to satisfy their claims by investing 
conservatively and taking minimal risk.”). 
 123  See Ramesh K.S. Rao, David Simon Sokolow and Derek White, Fiduciary Duty a la 
Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed 
Firm, 22 J. Corp. L. 53, 72 (1996) (“The fundamental source of creditor weakness for the 
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shareholders hold the residual claims, the erosion of that residual position would seem 
correspondingly to erode the justification.   One might view solvency and insolvency as 
two ends of a spectrum with the duty sliding from one constituency to another as the 
corporation moves along the spectrum.124 
2. Critique of the Shift in Duties 
 
Such a justification for the shift in the fiduciary rule applicable in the normal 
period is, however, highly problematic, since the bases that support the normal rule of 
denying creditors fiduciary duty protection do not change when a company enters 
insolvency.  Fundamentally, creditors both in and outside insolvent periods have the 
same risks and have the same tools at their disposal to deal with the risk.  
As the following discussion illustrates, the incentives of shareholders and creditors do 
not undergo a radical shift as a corporations financial status deteriorates.  While 
conflicts may intensify, the ex-ante bargains struck prior to insolvency remain effective 
to counteract the desire of shareholders to increase risk.  In addition, shifting and then 
re-shifting the beneficiaries of corporate managers’ fiduciary duties as the corporation 
moves from solvency into the vicinity of insolvency, and then into actual insolvency, 
creates a lack of clarity that has pernicious effects on the ability of all parties to bargain 
for, price and enforce specific contractual protections. 
 
To the extent shareholder wealth maximization makes sense in normal periods, 
the underlying efficiency justification for the regime does not change prior to the point of 
bankruptcy.  The principal risk for creditors in both normal and insolvent periods is 
expropriation.  The risk is that shareholders, through their managers, will construct 
transactions that transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders.  In both periods, 
shareholders have an economic incentive and, if left unchecked, the wherewithal to 
construct such transactions that benefit shareholders at the expense of creditors.125 
financially-distressed firm is the increasing risk creditors bear as the firm slides toward 
insolvency.”). 
 124 See Rao, Sokolow and White, supra note 123 at 75 (describing fiduciary duties, and 
the legal liability resulting therefrom as shifting from shareholders to creditors as the firms 
financial condition worsens); Andrew D. Schaffer, Corporate Fiduciary  – Insolvent: The 
Fiduciary Relationship your Corporate Law Professor (should have) Warned you About, 8 Am. 
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 479, 542 (“[W]hen a corporation nears insolvency . . . a director/officer 
ought to start thinking more conservatively”). 
 125 One way to show this is through examples in which assets of corporations are re-
deployed in a more risky fashion.  Assume, first, that in a normal or solvent period that the assets 
of a firm worth 200 and that the creditors’ claims are 100 and the value of the firm’s 
shareholders’ interests is 100.  Assume that the firm is able to reinvest all its assets in a project 
that has a 50% chance of recognizing value of 400 and a 50% chance of recognizing value of 0.  
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 Thomas Smith has convincingly demonstrated that the presence of debt in a 
capital structure always carries with it a mismatch of incentives between shareholders 
and creditors that may, depending on the available investments, lead managers to 
maximize shareholder wealth at the expense of creditors.  In fact, given an investment 
opportunity of sufficient risk, Smith asserts that, even in solvent firms, shareholder 
wealth maximization might result in inefficient investments that maximize the value of 
the shareholders’ interests while reducing the overall value of the corporation.126 Thus, 
 
Although the expected value of the firm is unchanged – 200 – the values of the equity and debt 
are both affected.  Under the re-deployment, the value of the equity has increased to 150.  That 
consists of  a 50% probability of that shareholders will recognize 300 (400 total value, minus the 
100 prior creditors’ claim), or 150, plus a 50% probability of that shareholders will recognize 0. 
The value of the creditors’ instruments under the re-deployment, however, have decreased in 
value to only 50.  Creditors have a 50% chance of 100 (their total claim will be paid if the value 
of the firm goes to 400), or 50, plus a 50% chance of 0.  (To simplify the example, I am ignoring 
the fact that the market may value the re-deployed assets at less than 200, due to the increase in 
volatility risk.  If the volatility is due entirely to risk that is unique to the firm, however, some 
would argue that the market would not demand a premium (or at least not much of a premium) 
for the increased volatility, since an investor can cheaply eliminate the volatility by holding a 
diversified investment portfolio.  See Richard A. Brealey and Steward C. Myers, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 141-237 (5th ed. 1996) (discussing risk, the capital asset pricing model and 
criticism of CAPM).   Even if the market sets a value of the redeployed assets at less than 200, 
however, the point is still made, albeit with somewhat more complicated math.)   
 This same risk of expropriation of creditor value through asset redeployment exists in a 
period of corporate insolvency.  Assume now that the assets of an insolvent firm are invested in a 
manner that generates a value of a value of 100, that creditors claims amount to 100 and the 
value of the firm’s shareholders’ interests is 0.  Assume that the firm reinvests its asset in a 
project with a 50% chance of amounting to 200 in value and 50% chance of amounting to 0.  
Although the total value of the firm remains at 100 following the re-deployment of the assets, 
creditor value decreases from 100 to 50, while shareholders’ value increases from 0 to 50. 
Creditors value may be described as a 50% probability of recognizing 100 and a 50% probability 
of recognizing 0.  Shareholders value may be described as a 50% chance of recognizing 100 (200 
less the 100 in creditors’ claims) and a 50% chance of recognizing 0. 
 These rather tedious examples demonstrate that in both insolvency and normal periods, 
shareholders and their surrogates – corporate managers – have fundamentally the same economic 
incentives to engage in transactions that expropriate creditor value.   
 
126  Smith, supra note 103 at 221-23; see also Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 1 
at 460-69 (demonstrating that in solvent periods gains by shareholders can result from either 
increased efficiencies, expropriation, or both). 
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as Smith shows, the basic problem that Chancellor Allen confronted in Credit Lyonnais 
affects all corporations.  The question is simply a matter of degree.127 
Although Smith’s project is to challenge the efficiency of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm in solvent companies, his conclusions also support the idea that 
financial distress does not provide a justification to change the status quo.  In fact, 
history may even suggest that creditors are actually more vulnerable to wealth transfer 
transactions in normal or solvent periods than they are in periods of insolvency, making 
it somewhat ironic that courts would choose to enhance creditor protection in periods of 
insolvency.  One may recall, in that regard, that the most notorious and seemingly the 
largest concentration of  expropriation of creditor wealth seemed to occur outside of 
insolvent periods.  Specifically we refer to the expropriation of shareholder wealth that 
occurred in the highly leveraged acquisitions of the 1980s.  Notwithstanding the number 
of such expropriative transactions128 and the staggeringly large estimates of the total 
value of creditors’ losses in such transactions,129 society chose not to imposes fiduciary 
duties running in favor of creditors injured by such transactions but chose instead to 
 
127  In Smith’s view, the incentive for shareholders of distressed firms to make 
investments that are socially inefficient “has to do with the firm being in the vicinity of only in a 
trivial sense.  It is just that the closer to insolvency a firm is, the less risky a bet  has to be for its 
loss to push the firm into bankruptcy. Id. See also Crespi, supra note 97 at 147 (investments 
outside of the vicinity of insolvency “can also result in expected shareholder wealth effects that 
diverge from expected corporation wealth effects.”). 
 128 See, e.g., Thomas R. Hurst & Larry G. McGuinness, The Corporation, The 
Bondholder and Fiduciary Duties, 10 J. L. & Com. 187, 190, n. 14 (1991) (reporting that 
between 1984 and 1989, 230 companies were involved in transactions that resulted in 
downgrading of credit rating).  See also, Marcel Kahan & Michael Klauser, Antitakeover 
Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 
931, 933, n.2 (1993) (reporting that from 1984 though 1988, 183 companies lost value in their 
bonds due to acquisitions or LBOs).  
 129See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. Corp. L. 205. 206 
(1988) (referring to bondholder losses during this period as “possibly the largest expropriation of 
investors in American business history.”).  See also Kahan & Klauser, supra note 128, at 933 
(describing acquisitions and LBOs of the period as transforming “blue-chip bonds valued in the 
tens of billions of dollars into speculative-grade ‘junk’”).  The RJR Nabisco acquisition alone 
was estimated to create $40 million in bondholder losses.  James Sterngold, Kohlberg Leads 
Latest Nabisco Bids, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1988, at D1.  On the RJR acquisition, see generally 
Deborah A. DeMott, Introduction – The Biggest Deal Ever, 1989 Duke L.J. 1.     
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continue to expect creditors during normal periods to bargain for their own 
protections.130 
In addition, creditors have the same tool available to protect themselves from 
such transactions, whether the transactions occur in the normal period or the period of 
insolvency.  The protective tool is ex ante contract, and creditors can use it with equal 
effectiveness against transactions in either period.  Well crafted financial covenants in 
debt instruments can accomplish two goals.  First, they can prohibit transactions that 
unduly increase the risk that the corporation will become insolvent in the first instance.  
Negative covenants prohibiting dividends, additional debt, substantial capital acquisition 
or divestiture or a change in business may restrict managers who seek to increase the 
risk creditors of a solvent business face.  In addition, financial covenants may also 
define default in a way that permits creditors to exercise default and acceleration rights 
upon the corporations failure to meet certain financial targets.  Net worth covenants, for 
example, not only guard against transactions that reduce corporate value, but they also 
give rise to a right to call a default, thereby permitting a creditor to withdraw capital or 
take control when the financial status of the corporation deteriorates through normal 
market forces.131 There is no reason to assume that creditors are less able through ex 
ante bargaining to protect themselves from actions that may take place in insolvency 
than in normal periods. 
 
Thus, there appears to be little reason to justify a shift from shareholder wealth 
maximization to creditor or corporate wealth maximization when a corporation becomes 
distressed.  The shift creates confusion for managers seeking to determine the 
standards by which their behavior will be judged.  More significant, however, is the 
difficulty such a shift in duty creates for financial markets seeking to negotiate and price 
creditor protections.  A poorly defined, constantly shifting focus for managerial duties 
does not provide a stable backdrop for bargaining.  How much contractual protection 
creditors need is a function of how much protection the law provides.  It is difficult to 
negotiate specific covenants when there is uncertainty regarding the default rules that 
 
130 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 
1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).   
 131  In a sense, these financial covenants may operate to shift control of the corporate 
assets from shareholders to creditors when the corporation reaches a contractually defined 
“vicinity of insolvency.”  The failure to achieve financial targets results in an immediate right to 
payment, or failing that, a right to take control of the assets through bankruptcy or non-
bankruptcy debt collection processes.  Although creditors may not exercise these control rights 
directly, they may use the leverage these rights provide to negotiate an increase in control 
through additional restrictive covenants, creditor initiated management changes and changes in 
executive compensation.  See Stuart C. Gilson and Michael R Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in 
Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 Wash U. L.Q. 1005 (1994). 
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define managers’ obligations.  By the same token, how much risk creditors face is a 
function of how the law defines the legal obligation of managers to protect them.  
Without an understanding of the risk of a particular investment, one cannot set an 
appropriate interest rate.  The shifting and ambiguous regimes created by the Delaware 
courts create difficulties in pricing and allocating the risk of loss among the 
constituencies.  Transaction costs increase, and unintended outcomes seem more 
likely.132 
By contrast, a constant regime with clearly defined duties facilitates efficient 
pricing and allocation of risk of loss by corporate investors.  Creditors in a constant 
regime realize when they price their capital and accept an investment contract and an 
interest rate that managers are obligated in all periods prior to bankruptcy to take 
actions that benefit shareholders at their expense.  Consistency in the application of this 
principle allows creditors ex ante efficiently either to demand more interest for the risk or 
require  covenants to protect them across the entire time spectrum.  Creditors may, for 
example, demand a poison put to protect themselves from additional corporate leverage 
or a net worth covenant that permits exit or a change in control when the financial 
condition of the corporation deteriorates for any reason.  Applying a constant and 
unambiguous rule across the spectrum from normal period through vicinity of insolvency 
and insolvency facilitates efficient contracting and allocation of loss.133 
Finally, the ambiguous regime creates opportunities for management 
misbehavior by rendering enforcement difficult.  As Bainbridge has pointed out 
“[d]irectors who are responsible to everyone are accountable to no one.”134 A regime 
that permits shifting duties may allow managers to pursue their own interests, justifying 
their actions by pointing to a duty to one or another constituency.  Confusion over the 
precise nature of the duty at various stages of financial distress only exacerbates the 
problem. 
 
132  In all likelihood, the ambiguity created by the shifting duties will cause creditors to 
undervalue the protection that the duties provide.  Creditors can never be certain when managers 
will undertake a duty to look out for their interests.  Shareholders, on the other hand, are likely to 
overvalue the cost that the shift in duties imposes on them, assuming that managers will seek to 
protect creditors at the first available opportunity.  Such a distortion can only be remedied by 
clear, easily enforceable rules. 
 133 See Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and 
Statutory Design 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 559, 581 (2001) (“Crystalline rules minimize judicial 
discretion, clarify property boundaries, and shift resource allocation decisions out of court and 
into the market place.”). 
 134  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado about Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the 
Vicinity of Insolvency, at 23 working paper, on file with authors. 
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Thus, not only is a shift in duties unnecessary, it has negative effects on both the 
ex ante bargain struck by shareholders, creditors and managers and on the 
enforcement of those duties.  Maintaining a constant set of duties regardless of the 
financial status of the corporation permits the efficient allocation of risk and effective 
enforcement of managers’ duties. 
 
C. The Exception: Manager Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy 
 
Once the firm enters bankruptcy, a shift away from a shareholder wealth 
maximization regime to a regime that requires the managers of the debtor to maximize 
the overall value of the estate for the benefit of both shareholders and creditors makes 
sense.  Non-shareholder constituencies – principally creditors – are unable to protect 
themselves from actions in this period through ex ante contracting.  Also, this single 
shift does not unduly complicate ex ante contracting and pricing.   Rather, the financial 
contracting process can account specifically for the shift in duties that bankruptcy 
imposes and can build in provisions that make that shift in duties more likely.  Finally, 
the judicial supervision that characterizes the bankruptcy process reduces the 
enforcement problems that a duty to multiple constituencies outside of the confines of 
bankruptcy might generate. 
 
This shift in managers’ duty recognizes the changes that bankruptcy imposes on 
the governance of the firm.  Outside of bankruptcy, the efficiency argument for fiduciary 
duties to shareholders depends on the fact that creditors can draft contracts that will 
prevent inefficient expropriations of creditor wealth.135 In bankruptcy, however, the 
automatic stay prohibits creditors from enforcing their debt contracts and taking control 
of the corporation.  Thus, continuing to adhere to a requirement that managers act 
exclusively for shareholders would promote inefficient uses of corporate assets. 
 
Unchecked, shareholders’ incentive to forestall liquidation regardless of whether 
a liquidation would maximize the value of the corporation would lead to inefficient 
results.  Shareholders of insolvent companies have nothing to lose by delaying 
liquidation, but would gain in the event that a reorganization produces enough value to 
pay creditors.  Thus managers acting on their behalf might use the bankruptcy process 
strategically – inefficiently prolonging the reorganization efforts in an attempt to extract 
concessions from the creditors.136 
135  See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text 
 136 Consider, for example, a corporation in bankruptcy with debts of $80 and a 
liquidation value of $70.  Assume that the corporation has a 50% chance of reorganizing 
successfully with a value of $100.  If the reorganization fails, however, the assets will be worth 
only $20.   
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At the same time, as several commentators have pointed out,137 requiring 
managers to maximize the value of creditor claims can create inefficiencies in the 
opposite direction.  Because creditors bear most of the losses of failed reorganization 
attempts, but have to share the gains from successful reorganizations with the 
shareholders, creditors may have an incentive to inefficiently cut off promising 
reorganization efforts.138 
The bankruptcy process avoids both of these problems by requiring managers to 
focus on the value of the estate, rather than the value of any particular interest in the 
estate.  In this way the bankruptcy process prohibits inefficient managerial decisions 
that transfer wealth between classes of financial investors.  
 
This single shift in duties also has the advantage of providing a bright line 
standard that creditors and shareholders can account for in their investment contracts.  
By eliminating the confusion surrounding the timing of the shift creditors and 
shareholders can price the risk of their investments based on the assumption that the 
law will impose an obligation on managers to maximize shareholder wealth outside of 
bankruptcy and to maximize the overall value of the corporation during bankruptcy.  Not 
only does this clarity provide for better pricing, but it also provides a baseline against 
which more specific covenants can be crafted. 
 
An attempt at reorganization here would be inefficient, resulting in an expected value of 
$60 instead of the $70 value of a present liquidation.   Shareholders, however, would opt for the 
reorganization.  This is because, the expected value to the shareholders of the reorganization is 
$10, while the expected value of the liquidation option is zero.  The $10 value to shareholders 
comes at the expense of creditors who would value this investment at only $50.  Managers who 
are bound to act in the best interests of shareholders would use every means at their disposal to 
insure that the reorganization option is pursued, notwithstanding the fact that the effort results in 
the net loss of $10 and an expropriation from creditors of $10 with no efficiency gains.  For a 
similar example, see Lin, supra note 48 at 1495-96 . 
 137 See Alon Chaver and Jesse M. Fried, Managers’ Fiduciary Duty upon the Firm’s 
Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1813, 1823 (2002); Lin, 
supra note 48 at 1492-93; Lipson, supra note 116 at 1225 (2003). 
 138  Assume now that the reorganization efforts chance of success is 80%, but the asset 
values remain the same.  This increased chance of success would render the effort to reorganize 
efficient, with an expected value of $84.  Because this value exceeds the present liquidation 
value of the corporation, the reorganization is the efficient choice.  Of course, shareholders 
would agree that the reorganization should be attempted.  The expected value of this 
reorganization to the shareholders is $16 If however, managers are directed to act in the best 
interests of the creditors, the reorganization will not be pursued because the effort would result in 
an expected value to the creditors of $68 – $2 less than the value they expect on liquidation.  For 
a similar example, see Chaver and Fried, supra note 137 at 1823 (example 3).  
44
 
The shift in managers’ fiduciary duties from the shareholders to the estate 
provides only a partial response to these inefficient investment incentives, however.  In 
addition, judicial oversight of specific decisions as well as provisions to replace 
managers with a bankruptcy trustee provide a mechanism that helps to assure that 
managers fulfill their duties to maximize the value of the assets under their control.139 
This close supervision by the bankruptcy judge thus ameliorates the enforcement 
problems that inhere in any system that divides managerial loyalties among naturally 
adverse constituencies.140 
The performance of the bankruptcy process in meeting the goal of asset value 
maximization has been the subject of a vigorous scholarly debate for nearly two 
decades.  Bankruptcy scholarship throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's criticized 
the bankruptcy governance structure as being too heavily skewed toward shareholder 
interests.141 Managers were depicted as maintaining their allegiance to shareholders, 
taking actions that prolonged the reorganization of firms that should have been 
liquidated quickly.  The bias of managers toward reorganization was seen as an effort 
 
139  In fact, several commentators have noted that as a control on managers behavior, fiduciary 
duties are much less important in bankruptcy than they are outside of the process.  In their 
empirical study of corporate governance in publically held corporations, LoPucki and Whitford 
stated that fiduciary obligations in bankruptcy are largely of “theoretical value” because creditors 
and shareholders have an opportunity to directly challenge managerial conduct in the 
reorganization process. Lynn M. LoPucki and Whitford C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in 
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publically Held Companies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 669, 
709-710 (1993). 
 140 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 141  See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 439 
(1992); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45
Stan. L. Rev. 311 (1993) Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J. Law, 
Econ. & Org. 523 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations,
15 J. Legal Stud. 127 (1986); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate 
Reorganizations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 775 (1988); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The 
Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale L.J. 1043 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's 
Choice:  A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 51 (1992); Mark J. Roe, 
Bankruptcy and Debt:  A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 527 
(1983); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471 (1994) 
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on their part to use their continued control over the business to force inefficient wealth 
transfers from creditor classes to shareholder classes.142 
More recently, some bankruptcy scholars have detected a shift in the opposite 
direction.  Increasingly sophisticated creditors, particularly secured creditors, employing 
tools such as debtor in possession financing and management retention agreements, 
have managed to seize control of the bankruptcy process in some cases – effectively 
forcing a shift toward creditor value maximization and a bias toward liquidation of 
healthy companies.143 If present, this liquidation bias may create inefficiencies no less 
troubling than those created by a reorganization bias by prematurely liquidating 
companies that have a positive going concern value.144 
Whether these claims of inefficient reorganization or liquidation bias are 
sustainable is beyond the scope of this paper.  If Chapter 11 is dominated by senior 
secured creditors seeking to use the process to maximize their own recoveries, that fact 
would provide even more reason to require managers to adhere to a duty to maximize 
the value of the estate.  In addition, as a general matter, Bankruptcy judges have shown 
themselves to be sensitive to the presence of liquidation and reorganization bias and 
creative in developing techniques to combat them.  What remains important for our 
purposes is the general attitude that the path to efficiency lies in focusing on the value 
of the assets and in requiring managers to adhere to that focus. 
 
142  See, e.g. Bradley and Rosenzweig, supra note 141 at 1076 (“"Filing a Chapter 11 
petition, in effect, is a way to keep control of the firm free from the intrusive monitoring of 
creditors, thereby permitting management to extract wealth from the firm's various security 
holders.") 
 143  See Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan L. 
Rev. 751 (2002); Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 Stan. 
L. Rev. 673 (2003); David A. Skeel Jr., Creditors’ Ball The “New” New Corporate Governance 
in Chapter 11, 152 U. Penn. L. Rev. 917 (2003); George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11 21
Bankr. Dev. J. 19 (2004).  Not all commentators are convinced, however.  See Stephen J. 
Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 Ky. L. J. 839 (2004); Lynn M. LoPucki, The 
Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen’s “The End of Bankrupty,” 
56 Stan. L. Rev. 645 (2003). 
 144  See Lubben, supra note 143 at 856 (discussing the difficulties the creditor control 
model presents in sorting good (efficient) cases from bad (inefficient) ones) ; Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 795, 844 (“creditor control 
risks realization of substantially less than the full value of the asset being sold.”).  Baird and 
Rasmussen, however, contest the idea that creditor control leads to inefficient liquidations of 
firms with going concern value by arguing that fewer firms than most suspect have positive 
going concern value.  Baird and Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 143 at 758. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
The governance of the modern corporation generally relies on some combination 
of contractual and fiduciary regulation.  As a matter of positive law, the governance 
rules applicable to solvent corporations obligate managers to fulfill their fiduciary duty to 
maximize shareholder wealth.  Creditors and other constituencies must seek protection 
through contract.  Although the rule itself is controversial, it at least has the virtue of 
providing clarity for managers seeking to fulfill their duties, for courts evaluating 
managers’ actions, and, most importantly, for investors seeking to negotiate contracts 
and price their investments. 
 
Recent judicial decisions that attempt to articulate a shift in that duty as a 
corporation becomes financially distressed have thrown this straightforward rule into 
chaos.  Courts have failed to formulate clear standards regarding both the timing of the 
shift and the ultimate beneficiaries of the duties at the particular stages of financial 
decline.  As a result, the clarity that permits efficient contracting is lost. 
 
This state of affairs is both unfortunate and unnecessary.  Nothing about 
insolvency, per se, dictates that a separate set of rules should govern the relationship 
among shareholders, creditors and managers.  In fact, creditor contracts are fashioned 
with insolvency in mind.  Restrictive covenants and the definition of default under 
creditor contracts contemplate that the corporations financial status can change and 
these provisions often are structured in a way to permit creditors to exercise more 
control over the assets when a company becomes financially distressed.  The initiation 
of a bankruptcy case provides the only point at which these obligations should shift.   
 
